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Hedge Fund Franchises
William Fung, David Hsieh, Narayan Naik, Melvyn Teo⇤
Management Science, forthcoming
Abstract
We investigate the growth strategies of hedge fund firms. We find that firms with
successful first funds are able to launch follow-on funds that charge higher performance
fees, set more onerous redemption terms, and attract greater inflows. Motivated by the
aforementioned spillover e↵ects, first funds outperform follow-on funds, after adjusting
for risk. Consistent with the agency view, greater incentive alignment moderates the
performance di↵erential between first and follow-on funds. Moreover, multiple-product
firms underperform single-product firms but harvest greater fee revenues, thereby hurt-
ing investors while benefitting firm partners. Investors respond to this growth strategy
by redeeming from first funds of firms with follow-on funds that do poorly. Empirically,
the multiple-product firm has become the dominant business model for the hedge fund
industry.
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assistance of Kelvin Min, Yan Qiu, and Lin Sun. This is a substantially revised version of the paper entitled
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1. Introduction
“The Board’s point of view is that at its essence the Man Group’s strategy is a growth
strategy. . . . And when we’re looking therefore at each aspect of our business, we have to be
able to grow it. We have to be able to scale it.”
– Kevin Hayes, Man Group1
Hedge funds collectively managed close to US$3 trillion in assets in 2017.2 Institutional
investors have grown to become the dominant investor clientele in this industry.3 Concomi-
tantly, increased regulatory and compliance costs, as well as a heightened pressure to lower
hedge fund fees, have ratcheted up the critical mass needed for a hedge fund firm to sustain
operations with management fee revenues.4 Therefore, it has become imperative for hedge
fund firms to grow in order to attract large institutional investors and to spread the higher
fixed costs over a larger asset base. While recent academic work has emphasized how the
incentives of hedge fund managers motivate asset growth (Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach, 2016;
Yin, 2016), the question remains: how do hedge fund firms grow?
Our paper fills this gap by focusing on the behaviour of hedge fund firms who have
managed to create a track record and who now face a choice of growth strategy. We start
with the observation that hedge fund firms often operate multiple funds, and not all funds
managed by a hedge fund firm command the same regard from investors. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that the reputation of a multiple-fund firm rests heavily on the performance of its
1See Pozen and Clay (2012, p. 6).
2See https://www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/ghs/mum/HF Money Under Management.html.
3See “Hedge funds must grapple with shifting balance of power,” Financial Times, 25 August 2015, for a
discussion on the institutionalization of the hedge fund industry.
4According to Troy Gayeski, partner at SkyBridge, a New York-based fund of funds, “Ten years ago a
hedge fund with $50m of assets could generate plenty of revenue to cover overheads. These days it has to
be $500m, and part of the reason is that regulatory requirements have gone up dramatically.” See “Hedge
funds move to family o ces is not entirely popular,” Financial Times, 23 October 2015. For a discussion on
fees see “Hedge funds cut fees to stem client exodus,” Financial Times, 18 December 2015, and “Calpers to
pare external managers,” Wall Street Journal, 8 June 2015.
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first fund.5 Having started her first fund, in order to grow her business, a hedge fund manager
faces two choices. She could (i) simply grow the assets under management (henceforth
AUM) of a single commingled fund or product, or (ii) o↵er multiple funds or products.
Which of these two options is the preferred one? Do hedge fund firms leverage o↵ the stellar
performance of their first funds to launch additional funds? Do the capital raising activities
of multiple-product firms benefit investors? How do such activities impact the total fee
revenue of the hedge fund firm? And how do investors respond to firms that launch multiple
products?
Our results are striking. We find that hedge fund firms with successful first funds are more
likely to launch multiple follow-on funds. Moreover, the follow-on funds that they launch
charge higher performance fees, set more onerous redemption terms, and attract greater
inflows. These e↵ects prevail after controlling for the performance of the other follow-on
funds conceived by the same firm. Indeed, past first fund performance predicts future flows
into follow-on funds over and above the explanatory power of their respective track records.
Further, the intra-firm spillover e↵ects from first funds are substantially stronger than those
from the other funds launched by hedge fund firms.
In light of the positive spillover e↵ects engendered by first funds, are managers incen-
tivized to deliver better performance with the earlier funds launched by their firms? We find
that first funds outperform follow-on funds by 1.88 percent per annum after adjusting for co-
variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors and controlling for the other variables
that can explain fund performance. The e↵ect is statistically significant at the one percent
level. Moreover, the di↵erence between first and follow-on fund performance is even stronger
for the follow-on funds that are launched later. The abnormal return spread between the
first and the second to fifth funds launched is a statistically reliable but economically mod-
5For example, the Financial Times reported that Man Group’s stock rose buoyed by the outperformance
of its first fund, AHL. See “Man Group outperforms as first fund sparkles,” Financial Times, 24 September
2011. Similarly, the Wall Street Journal reported that BlueCrest plans to stop managing money for outside
clients after a run of poor returns and client redemptions from its first fund, BlueCrest Capital International.
See “BlueCrest capital decides to go private,” Wall Street Journal, 2 December 2015.
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est 1.79 percent, while the analogous spread between the first and the eleventh to twentieth
funds launched is an impressive 3.45 percent per year. These findings cannot be explained
by di↵erences in fund share restrictions and illiquidity (Aragon, 2007; Aragon and Strahan,
2012), fund fees (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009), age (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010), size
(Berk and Green, 2004), return smoothing behavior (Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004),
and backfill and incubation bias (Liang, 2000; Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst, 2014).
Hedge fund investors do not benefit from the capital raising activities of multiple-product
firms. Portfolio sorts indicate that multiple-product firms on average underperform single-
product firms by a statistically reliable 3.77 percent per annum after adjusting for risk. Yet,
despite underperforming single-product firms, multiple-product firms harvest fee revenues
that are on average US$21.68 million per annum higher than those harvested by single-
product firms. The larger size of the multiple-product firms explains much of the di↵erence
in fee revenue.6
Empirical evidence shows that the outperformance of the first fund is driven by strong
initial performance, which moderates after the launch of the first follow-on fund. Prior to
follow-on fund launches, first funds of multiple-product firms deliver a return of 10.83% per
year after adjusting for risk. However, upon the launch of the first follow-on fund, first
funds’ alpha deteriorates by 5.35% per annum. The reduction in performance is 1.92%
greater than that for comparable first funds at other firms, and is driven in part by limited
attention and the crowding out of investment opportunities. Instead of protecting the first
fund’s performance by limiting its AUM growth, multiple-product firms typically grow AUM
across all products, i.e., first as well as follow-on.
Investors’ confidence in firms with successful first funds is not completely misplaced.
Stellar first fund performance is associated with better subsequent follow-on fund and first
fund performance. We find that on average, a one percentage point increase in the first
6In the paper, we principally label as multiple-product firms, those with multiple funds. That said, our
results prevail when we define as multiple-product firms, those with multiple distinct strategies. Specifically,
firms with uncorrelated strategies underperform those with one strategy (or correlated strategies), but harvest
greater fee revenues.
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fund’s monthly alpha in the 12-month period prior to the launch of the first follow-on fund
precipitates a 13.6 basis point increase in follow-on fund monthly alpha, and a 12.6 basis
point increase in the first fund monthly alpha, in the 12-month post launch period. Therefore,
it seems that investors who subscribe to a new fund launched by a hedge fund firm with
a stellar first fund are responding rationally to the positive outlook that such an event is
signaling at the beginning of the firm’s capital raising campaign.
Just as stellar performance of the first fund can help capital raising for the firm, poor
performance of follow-on funds can be detrimental to this process. We find evidence of
a significant blowback e↵ect from follow-on funds to the first fund. Lower follow-on fund
returns over the past one and two years are associated with lower flows into the first fund of
the same hedge fund firm after controlling for past first fund returns, flows, and performance
volatility. This blowback e↵ect suggests that firms need to balance quantity with quality
when embarking on such a growth path.
The results in this paper resonate with two strands of research on hedge funds. The first
strand sheds light on hedge fund alpha and finds that incentivized (Agarwal, Daniel, and
Naik, 2009), geographically proximate (Teo, 2009), emerging (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010),
and distinctive (Sun, Wang, and Zheng, 2012) hedge funds deliver higher alpha. We show
that hedge funds that are conceived earlier by their firms also outperform.7
The second strand examines agency problems and finds that some hedge funds strategi-
cally delay reporting poor performance (Aragon and Nanda, 2017), inflate their December
returns (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2011), and take on excessive liquidity risk (Teo, 2011).8
We find that consistent with the agency view, better incentive alignment via manager co-
investment, greater weight on incentive fees, higher manager total deltas, and elevated flow-
performance sensitivity help ameliorate the tendency of hedge fund firms to launch follow-on
funds that underperform first funds.
7Unlike Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) who analyze the impact of time since fund launch on performance,
we investigate the association between the launch order of funds within firms and performance.
8Jorion and Schwarz (2014) argue that the discontinuity at zero in the hedge fund net return distribution
documented by Bollen and Pool (2009) is not evidence of manager manipulation.
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This paper echoes research on the strategic behavior of mutual fund families (Massa,
2003; Nanda, Wang, and Zheng, 2004; Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2006; Sialm and Tham,
2016). While Massa (2003) investigates the relation between the performance of a mutual
fund family in a category and the degree of product di↵erentiation in the category, we study
the link between the performance of a hedge fund firm and the degree of fund or strategy
proliferation in the firm itself. Unlike Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004), who document
positive spillover e↵ects in the form of greater flows to the other mutual funds of families
with stars, we show that for hedge funds intra-firm spillover e↵ects extend beyond flows to
include fees, redemption terms, and performance.
Our work complements Kolokolova (2011) and Yin (2016). Kolokolova (2011) finds that
hedge fund firms with high past returns are more likely to launch new funds and attract
inflows. She does not di↵erentiate between first and follow-on funds. We believe that focusing
on first funds is critical as stellar first fund performance allows a firm to transition from a
single-product to a multiple-product firm. Indeed, we show that the spillover e↵ects are
substantially stronger from first funds to follow-on funds than from follow-on funds to the
later funds launched by the firm. Further, stellar first fund performance is a reliable harbinger
of future fund launches. Therefore, the performance of the first fund is a stronger determinant
of hedge fund firm growth than is the performance of the subsequent funds launched by the
same firm. Yin (2016) argues that the hedge fund management compensation contract
induces individual hedge funds to grow beyond that which is optimal for fund performance.
While Yin (2016) focuses on the growth of the individual hedge fund, we focus on the growth
of the hedge fund firm.
Relative to Kolokolova (2011) and Yin (2016), we deepen our understanding of firm
strategic behavior by (i) documenting intra-firm spillover e↵ects from first funds to follow-
on funds and vice-versa, i.e., the blowback flow e↵ect, (ii) uncovering the relation between
fund launch order and performance, (iii) showing that incentive alignment helps ameliorate
the tendency of firms to launch follow-on funds that underperform first funds, (iv) exploring
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intra-firm fund performance persistence, (v) testing the impact of firm strategy diversification
on fund performance, and (vi) tracing the deterioration in first fund performance when firms
launch follow-on funds to limited attention and the crowding out of investment opportunities.
By finding evidence of intra-firm performance persistence, we resolve the conundrum raised
by Kolokolova (2011) about the apparent irrationality of fund investors that respond to
short-lived firm performance. Our results suggest that stellar first fund performance not
only allows first funds to grow capital beyond the optimal point, as in Yin (2016), but
also allows their management companies to do likewise via the launch of follow-on funds.
Consequently, the indirect incentives facing hedge fund managers, especially those managing
first funds, are likely to be even stronger than those suggested by Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach
(2016).
The endogeneity of firm growth strategy does not explain the underperformance of hedge
funds launched later by firms. The multivariate regression methodology that we employ
allows us to sidestep concerns that observed di↵erences between funds managed by single-
and multiple-product firms explain our results. To cater for unobserved di↵erences between
single- and multiple-product firms, we run an instrumental variables analysis with the supply
of investment capital at firm founding as the instrument. We find that first funds outperform
follow-on funds even more after instrumenting for firm growth strategy. Similarly, the more
general result that the later funds launched by firms underperform the earlier funds prevails
after instrumenting for firm multiple-product status. Our choice of instrument follows Asker,
Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) and is robust to alternative specifications.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
methodology. Section 3 reports the results from the empirical analysis while Section 4
presents a medley of robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
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2. Data and methodology
We evaluate hedge funds using monthly net returns and AUM data of live and dead hedge
funds reported in the TASS, HFR, and BarclayHedge datasets from January 1990 to Decem-
ber 2013.9 Because TASS, HFR and BarclayHedge started distributing their data in 1994,
the data sets do not contain information on funds that died before December 1993. This
gives rise to survivorship bias. We mitigate this bias by focusing on data from January 1994
onward.
In our fund universe, we have a total of 16,828 hedge funds, of which 5,633 are live funds
and 11,195 are dead funds. The funds are roughly evenly split between the three databases.
While 1,704 funds appear in all three databases and 3,256 funds appear in two databases,
many funds belong to only one database. Specifically, there are 3,729 funds, 3,735 funds,
and 4,404 funds peculiar to the TASS, HFR, and BarclayHedge databases, respectively. This
highlights the advantage of obtaining data from multiple sources. In our analysis, we focus
on the sample of funds without duplicate share classes due to concerns that funds with
multiple share classes could cloud the analysis.10 Removing duplicate share classes from the
sample leaves us with a total of 15,607 hedge funds, of which 5,269 are live funds and 10,338
are dead funds.
We define first funds as the first fund launched by each hedge fund firm. Follow-on funds
are the other funds launched by hedge fund firms. To determine fund status, we sort our
sample of funds based on fund inception date within the firm. To ensure that there is only
one first fund per firm, when more than one fund is launched in the same month by a firm,
we merge them to form a composite fund and treat it as that firm’s first fund.11 The fund
9The results are robust to using pre-fee returns.
10If a hedge fund firm has an onshore and o↵shore fund pair, we drop the o↵shore fund, essentially treating
it like a duplicate share class. We also find that our baseline results do not change if we drop the onshore
fund in those cases. Our findings are therefore not driven by di↵erences between the onshore and o↵shore
duplicate of the same fund (Aragon, Liang, and Park, 2014).
11Of the 6,882 firms in our sample, 6,387 have a single first component fund while only 495 have multiple
first component funds. In other words, 93 percent of the firms in our sample started with only one fund. The
average number of first component funds per firm is 1.087. In lieu of forming composite first funds, we cater
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attributes and monthly returns of the composite fund are simply the average fund attribute
and average monthly returns of its component funds, respectively. The monthly AUM of the
composite fund is the sum of the monthly AUM of its component funds.
Following Joenva¨a¨ra¨, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2018), we classify hedge funds into 12
investment styles: Commodity Trading Advisor, Emerging Markets, Event Driven, Global
Macro, Long Only, Equity Long/Short, Market Neutral, Multi-Strategy, Relative Value,
Sector, Short Bias, and Others. Table 1 breaks down the funds by investment strategy
and reports the first and follow-on fund distribution as well as the number of live and dead
funds in each strategy. To facilitate comparison with our overall fund sample, the first funds
reported in Table 1 include all the component first funds launched by hedge fund firms. So,
there are more first funds reported in Table 1 than there are firms. There are 6,882 firms
in our sample. When the component funds are grouped together to form composite funds
so that each firm is linked to only one first fund, there are 4,618 firms with only one fund,
1,921 firms with two to five funds, 232 firms with six to ten funds, 85 firms with 11 to 20
funds, and 26 firms with more than 20 funds. The time between successive fund launches is
a decreasing function of the number of funds already launched by the firm. After conceiving
its first fund, a firm takes about 38 months on average to launch the second fund, another
28 months to launch the third fund, and another 22 months to launch the fourth fund.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Hedge fund data are susceptible to many biases (Liang, 2000; Fung and Hsieh, 2009).
These biases stem from the fact that inclusion in hedge fund databases is voluntary. As a
result, there is a self-selection bias. For instance, funds often undergo an incubation period in
which they rely on internal funding before seeking capital from outside investors. Incubated
funds with successful track records then go on to list in various hedge fund databases while
for the possibility that firms may launch more than one fund in their first month in two alternative ways.
First, we drop firms that have more than one first fund, i.e., firms that launched more than one fund during
their first month. Second, for such firms, we consider the largest fund launched during the first month as the
first fund (based on fund AUM for the launch month) and remove the other smaller fund or funds conceived
during that month. Our baseline results remain qualitatively unchanged with these adjustments.
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the unsuccessful funds do not, resulting in an incubation bias. Related to this, when a
fund is listed on a database, it often includes data prior to the listing date. Again, because
successful funds have a strong incentive to list and attract capital inflows, these backfilled
returns tend to be higher than the non-backfilled returns. In the analysis that follows, we
will repeat the tests after dropping the first 24 months of return data from each fund to
ensure that the results are robust to backfill and incubation bias. To fully address concerns
about backfill bias raised by Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst (2014) and others, we also
redo the tests after removing all return observations that have been backfilled prior to fund
listing date.
Throughout this paper, we model the risks of hedge funds using the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model. The Fung and Hsieh factors are the excess return on the Standard and
Poor’s (S&P) 500 index (SNPMRF); a small minus big factor (SCMLC) constructed as the
di↵erence between the Wilshire small and large capitalization stock indices; the yield spread
of the US ten-year Treasury bond over the three-month Treasury bill, adjusted for duration
of the ten-year bond (BD10RET); the change in the credit spread of Moody’s BAA bond
over the ten-year Treasury bond, also appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY);
and the excess returns on portfolios of look back straddle options on currencies (PTFSFX),
commodities (PTFSCOM), and bonds (PTFSBD), which are constructed to replicate the
maximum possible return from trend following strategies (see Fung and Hsieh, 2001) on
their respective underlying assets.12 These seven factors have been shown by Fung and
Hsieh (2004) to have considerable explanatory power on hedge fund returns.




3.1. Spillover e↵ects within hedge fund firms
Our first set of tests focuses on spillover e↵ects within hedge fund firms. We ask, do hedge
fund firms take advantage of the stellar performance of their first funds to launch additional
funds? If so, how does superior first fund performance benefit the follow-on funds managed
by the same firm?
To test the relation between first fund performance and the probability of follow-on fund
launches, we estimate logit regressions on LAUNCH, an indicator variable that takes a
value of one if a firm launches at least one fund in that year. We include as an independent
variable, FIRSTALPHA or first fund alpha averaged over the last 12, 24, and 36 months.
Fund alpha is fund monthly abnormal return after stripping away co-variation with the Fung
and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, and is estimated for all funds with at least 24 months of
return information.13 We control for calendar year fixed e↵ects and base statistical infer-
ences on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm
level. The results reported in the leftmost column of Table 2 indicate that past stellar first
fund performance is a reliable harbinger of future fund launches. The coe cient estimates
on FIRSTALPHA are statistically significant at the one percent level for all look back
horizons. The marginal e↵ects indicate that a one standard deviation (or 0.92 percentage
point) increase in past 36-month alpha is associated with a 0.83 percentage point increase
in the probability of a fund launch the next year. This is economically significant given that
the unconditional probability of launching at least one fund in any year is 7.53 percentage
points.
Unsurprisingly, the association between first fund performance and future fund launches
is stronger for the earlier follow-on funds launched by a firm. We define SECONDALPHA
13The results remain qualitatively unchanged when alpha is estimated for all funds with at least 36 months
of return data.
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and THIRDALPHA as the alphas of the second and third funds launched by the firm,
respectively. When we include as an additional independent variable, SECONDALPHA,
in the regressions, we find that the coe cient estimates on FIRSTALPHA are still sta-
tistically significant at the one or five percent level, while those on SECONDALPHA are
not. However, when we also include as an additional independent variable THIRDALPHA
in the regressions, we find that the coe cient estimate on FIRSTALPHA is statistically
significant at the five percent level only for monthly alpha averaged over the last 36 months.
This suggests that first fund performance is a more reliable predictor of the second and third
fund launches than of the later fund launches by the same firm.
Since, hedge fund investors may not chase complex risk-adjusted measures such as the
Fung and Hsieh (2004) alpha, we re-estimate the logit regressions with fund returns in place
of fund alphas. It is comforting to note that the results are even stronger when we an-
alyze fund returns. As shown in columns (4) to (6) of Table 2, the coe cient estimates
on FIRSTRET are significant at the one percent level in the univariate regressions and
in the regressions that control for SECONDRET over all performance horizons. They
are also significant at the five percent level when we include THIRDRET as an addi-
tional independent variable for monthly returns averaged over the last 12 or 36 months.
FIRSTRET , SECONDRET , and THIRDRET are simply the fund return equivalents of
FIRSTALPHA, SECONDALPHA, and THIRDALPHA, respectively.14 Collectively,
these results suggest that the performance of the first fund is a stronger determinant of firm
growth than is the performance of the subsequent funds launched by the same firm.
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here]
Next, we test the relation between the past performance of the first fund and the fund
attributes of as well as flows into follow-on funds. Specifically, we estimate the following
14In results available upon request, we also find that first fund performance is positively associated to the
total number of follow-on funds conceived several years later. For example, when we sort firms into quintiles
based on first fund returns averaged over the first three years post inception, we find that the cumulative
number of follow-on funds launched up to five years later for firms in the highest performance quintile is
significantly greater than that for firms in the lowest performance quintile.
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OLS regressions:
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where in Eq. (1), FIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 and NFIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 are the first
and other follow-on fund monthly alpha averaged over the last 12 months prior to the launch
of fund i in month m, respectively, FUNDATTRIBUTEi is either follow-on fund manage-
ment fee, performance fee, redemption period, or notice period, STY LEDUMki is follow-on
fund style dummy for style k, and Y EARDUMyi is follow-on fund inception year dummy
for year y. We assume that the fund attributes reported in the commercial databases are
determined at fund launch. In Eq. (2), FUNDFLOWim is own fund monthly net inflow,
FUNDALPHAim 12,m 1 is own fund monthly alpha averaged over the last 12 months,
FUNDV OLim 12,m 1 is standard deviation of own fund monthly alpha estimated over the
last 12 months, and FUNDHWMi is own fund high-water mark indicator. We also estimate
variants of the Eq. (1) and (2) regressions where the monthly alphas are averaged over the
last 24 or 36 months.15 Statistical inferences are based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered at the fund level.
The results reported in Panels A to C of Table 3 indicate that stellar first fund perfor-
mance confers a variety of benefits to the follow-on funds managed by the same firm. The
15Inferences do not change when we estimate regressions on raw fund returns instead of alphas. Note that
we windsorize fund returns and flows at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles to ameliorate the e↵ects of outliers.
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coe cient estimates on FIRSTALPHA in the fund attribute regressions suggest that con-
trolling for the performance of the other funds within the same firm, firms with stellar first
funds are able to raise follow-on funds that charge higher performance fees as well as set
longer redemption and notification periods.16 The impact of past first fund performance on
follow-on fund performance fee and on notice period is statistically significant at the one or
five percent level regardless of whether we average first fund alpha over the 12-, 24-, or 36-
month period prior to the follow-on fund launch. That on follow-on fund redemption period
is statistically significant at the one or five percent level when we average first fund alpha
over the 24- or 36-month period prior to follow-on fund launch. The results are economically
meaningful. For example, a one standard deviation (or 1.44 percentage point) improvement
in past 24-month alpha increases the notice period by 2.56 business days. This represents a
12.80% increase relative to a baseline notice period of a month, i.e., 20 business days.
Excellent first fund performance also allows hedge fund firms to raise more capital for their
follow-on funds. The coe cient estimates on FIRSTALPHA in the fund flow regressions
indicate that controlling for other factors, the impact of first fund performance on follow-on
fund flow is positive and statistically significant at the one or five percent level for alpha
averaged over the past 12, 24, and 36 months. Specifically, a one standard deviation (or
1.44 percentage point) improvement in monthly alpha over the past 24 months is associated
with a 0.40% increase in inflows into follow-on funds the next month. We note that the
impact of first fund performance on follow-on fund flow is about 31.58% as large as that of
own follow-on fund performance, at least based on performance averaged over the past 24
months. Collectively, these results indicate that hedge fund firms are incentivized to deliver
stellar performance with their first funds so as to raise follow-on funds on favorable terms.
We note that superior follow-on fund performance is associated with higher performance fees
16Our management fee results are broadly consistent with those of Ramadorai and Streatfield (2011).
While we find that successful first funds do not allow follow-on funds to charge higher management fees, we
also find that superior follow-on funds allow subsequent follow-on funds to charge higher management fees.
Therefore, like Ramadorai and Streatfield (2011), we do find that superior firm performance precedes higher
management fees. In unreported results, by estimating regressions on follow-on fund management fee with
past firm performance as the independent variable, we verify that this is indeed the case.
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for the later follow-on funds launched, although the spillover e↵ects from follow-on funds in
general appear to be weaker than those from first funds.
Do these spillover results apply uniquely to first funds as opposed to the second and
other follow-on funds launched by hedge fund firms? To test, we re-estimate the Eq. (1) and
(2) regressions on the fund attributes of and flows into the third and later funds launched
by hedge fund firms. We include SECONDALPHA and NSECONDALPHA as inde-
pendent variables in place of FIRSTALPHA and NFIRSTALPHA, respectively, where
SECONDALPHA is first follow-on fund monthly alpha and NSECONDALPHA is fund
monthly alpha averaged over all other funds in the firm. The results, reported in Table A1
of the Internet Appendix, indicate that the spillover e↵ects from first follow-on funds are
substantially weaker than those from first funds. While stellar first follow-on fund perfor-
mance is associated with longer redemption and notice periods for the subsequent follow-on
funds launched by the same firm, it is not associated reliably with higher performance fees
or, more importantly, higher flows into those funds.17
3.2. Tests of hedge fund performance
To test whether the stronger incentives that first funds face translate to superior performance,
we evaluate the performance of first funds relative to that of follow-on funds. Every month,
we sort funds within each hedge fund firm into 20 portfolios based on fund inception date.
The nth portfolio corresponds to the nth fund launched by the firm. The first portfolio is
simply the first fund portfolio. The other portfolios are the follow-on fund portfolios sorted
by launch date within the firm. Next, we average the returns of each fund inception portfolio
across hedge fund firms and evaluate the performance of the 1st fund (portfolio A), the 2nd to
5th funds launched (portfolio B), the 6th to 10th funds launched (portfolio C), and the 11th to
20th funds launched (portfolio D) relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model.
17In results available upon request, we find no evidence of spillover e↵ects on the fees, notice periods, and
flows of the subsequent funds, when we analyze the third funds, i.e., the second follow-on funds, launched
by hedge fund firms.
14
Portfolio B is simply the average of the 2nd to 5th fund inception portfolios. The other follow-
on fund portfolios are defined analogously. Since there are relatively few firms that launch
ten or more funds, the average number of funds in these portfolios decreases as we go from
portfolio A to portfolio D. On average, portfolio A comprises 2,238 funds, portfolio B covers
348 funds, portfolio C encompasses 67 funds, and portfolio D contains 18 funds. Statistical
inferences are based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
The results from the fund inception date sort, reported in Panel A of Table 4, indicate
that first funds outperform follow-on funds. Portfolio A delivers an average return of 5.28%
per annum after adjusting for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors, while
portfolio B delivers an average risk-adjusted return of 3.49%. The risk-adjusted spread
between these two portfolios is statistically significant at the one percent level (t-statistic =
5.68) but economically modest at 1.79% per annum after adjusting for risk. The abnormal
spread rises to a more impressive 3.45% per annum when we move from portfolio B to
portfolio D. These results suggest that the later funds launched by a hedge fund firm tend to
underperform the earlier funds launched by the same firm. Since small hedge funds may not
be relevant to large institutional investors, we also conduct the portfolio sort on the sample
of hedge funds with at least US$20m of AUM. The results reported in Panel B of Table 4
indicate that our findings are not driven by the smallest funds in the sample.
[Insert Table 4 and Figure 1 here]
Figure 1 complements the results from Panel A of Table 4. It illustrates the monthly
cumulative abnormal returns (henceforth CARs) from the portfolio of first funds (portfolio
A) and the portfolios of follow-on funds (portfolios B, C, and D). CAR is the cumulative
di↵erence between a portfolio’s excess return and its factor loadings (estimated over the
entire sample period) multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk factors. The CARs in
Figure 1 indicate that portfolio A consistently outperforms portfolios B, C, and D over the
entire sample period.
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There are concerns that first funds may outperform follow-on funds because the former
funds manage fewer assets and therefore are less a↵ected by capacity constraints (Berk and
Green, 2004). To allay such concerns, we estimate the following pooled OLS regression:
ALPHAim = a+ bFIRSTi + clog(SIZEim 1) + dMGTFEEi + ePERFFEEi







lyY EARDUMym + ✏im, (3)
where ALPHA is fund monthly abnormal return after stripping away co-variation with the
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, FIRST is an indicator variable that takes a value
of one when a fund is a first fund and a value of zero otherwise, SIZE is fund monthly
AUM in millions of US$, MGTFEE is fund management fee in percentage, PERFFEE
is fund performance fee in percentage, NOTICE is fund redemption notification period in
months, AGE is fund age in decades, STY LEDUM is fund style dummy, and Y EARDUM
is year dummy. The coe cient estimate on FIRST provides an indication of the spread in
risk-adjusted performance between first and follow-on funds. To facilitate the estimation of
fund alpha, we only include results for funds with at least 24 months of return data. We also
estimate the analogous regression on raw monthly fund returns to ensure that our findings
are not artifacts of the risk adjustment methodology. Statistical inferences are based on
White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the fund level.
The results from the cross-sectional regression analysis are reported in columns (1) and (2)
of Table 5. They corroborate the findings of the portfolio sorts and indicate that first funds
outperform follow-on funds. Specifically, the coe cient estimate on FIRST in the alpha
regression reported in column two of Table 5 reveals that, controlling for other factors that
could explain fund performance, first funds outperform follow-on funds by 1.88% per annum
after adjusting for risk. The coe cient estimates on the other control variables accord with
the extant literature. High-powered incentives or fees (Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, 2009) and
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longer redemption notice periods (Aragon, 2007) are associated with superior performance
while fund age is linked to poorer performance (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010). Inferences do
not change when we estimate the regression on raw returns suggesting that our findings are
not driven by our risk adjustment technology.
To check for robustness, we estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in place
of the OLS regressions. We compute the standard errors using the method of Newey and
West (1987) with a three-month lag to adjust for dependence across time. The Fama and
MacBeth (1973) results reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 echo our previous findings
and indicate that they are robust to alternative model specifications.
The portfolio sorts in Table 4 not only suggest that first funds outperform follow-on
funds but also allude to the more general finding that the earlier funds launched tend to
outperform the later funds launched by the same firm. To test the impact of fund chronology
in a regression setting, we re-estimate the Eq. (3) regressions with CHRONO in place of
FIRST , where CHRONO is fund launch order within the firm. The results reported in
columns (5) to (8) of Table 5 indicate that controlling for the other factors that influence fund
performance, funds that are launched earlier outperform funds that are launched later within
each firm. The results are economically and statistically significant. The OLS coe cient
estimate on CHRONO in column six of Table 5 reveals that a one standard deviation or
6.90 fund increase in fund launch order is associated with a 1.16 percent per annum reduction
in fund alpha.18
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here]
To test whether the underperformance of follow-on funds is driven by agency problems at
18We also estimate the same set of regressions as in Table 5 but with both FIRST and CHRONO as
independent variables, together with the same set of controls. The results are largely robust to the inclusion
of both independent variables in the regression. The coe cient estimates on FIRST are positive and
statistically significant at the one percent level across all regressions specifications. Those on CHRONO
are all negative and statistically significant at the one percent level, save for that in the Fama-MacBeth
regression on fund returns, which it is negative and statistically significant at the ten percent level. These
results are available upon request and suggest that successive fund performance continues to deteriorate even
after the launch of the first follow-on fund.
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hedge funds, we compare the performance di↵erential between first and follow-on funds for
hedge funds sorted by incentive alignment. One way to align incentives is for the manager
to co-invest personal capital alongside her limited partners. Hence, we sort funds into those
with and without personal capital, and re-estimate the Eq. (3) regressions. This is only
possible for TASS funds since only TASS provides information on personal capital. The
results reported in Panel A of Table 6 indicate that consistent with the agency view, the
outperformance of first funds is largely driven by funds with poor incentive alignment, i.e.,
those with no personal capital.19
To further investigate the agency view, each year, we sort hedge funds into equal groups
based on three additional proxies for incentive alignment: (i) the weight on fund incentive
fee, i.e., the ratio of fund performance fee to management fee, (ii) fund manager total delta,
and (iii) fund flow-performance sensitivity, and re-estimate the Eq. (3) regressions. Total
delta is computed at the end of the prior year and as per Appendix A of Agarwal, Daniel, and
Naik (2009). Fund flow-performance sensitivity is computed using past rolling 36 months of
flow and return data. Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) argue that performance fees and
manager deltas help align managers’ interests with those of their investors. We contend
that funds with higher flow-performance sensitivity also have greater incentive alignment.
The results reported in Panels B, C, and D of Table 6, are broadly consistent with the
agency view. First funds outperform follow-on funds more for funds with below-median
or low weights on performance fee than for funds with above-median or high weights on
performance fee. Similarly, the performance spread between first and follow-on funds tends
to be larger for funds with low manager total deltas than for funds with high manager total
deltas. Moreover, the underperformance of follow-on funds is greater for funds with low
flow-performance sensitivity than for those with high flow-performance sensitivity.
19The Fama-MacBeth regressions for the subsets of funds with and without personal capital reported in
Table 6 do not feature strategy fixed e↵ects as, within each group, there exist months for which there are no
funds in some strategies.
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3.3. Tests of hedge fund firm performance
Do investors benefit when hedge fund firms deliver superior performance with their first
funds and subsequently raise capital via follow-on funds? It is not clear whether the su-
perior performance of the first fund more than compensates for the inferior performance of
the follow-on funds launched by a hedge fund firm. To investigate, we estimate the Eq. (3)
OLS and Fama-MacBeth regressions with the independent variable NFUNDS in addition to
FIRST.20 The variable NFUNDS is the number of funds launched by the hedge fund firm.
The multivariate regression results reported in columns (1) to (4) of Table 7 are consistent
with the asset gathering view in which hedge fund firms with successful first funds take
advantage of their stellar track records and raise follow-on funds that subsequently under-
perform. The coe cient estimates on NFUNDS are negative and statistically significant at
the one or five percent level for all regression specifications.
[Insert Table 7 here]
The asset gathering view further predicts that in order to grow capital aggressively, firms
will o↵er funds in multiple divergent investment strategies to cater to an investor preference
for diversification (Massa, 2003). To test this view, estimate the Eq. (3) OLS and Fama-
MacBeth regressions with the independent variable STRATCORR in addition to FIRST.
The variable STRATCORR is the average pairwise correlation of the strategies engaged
by the firm. The advantage of analyzing strategy divergence as opposed to the number
of strategies within each firm is that we avoid commingling firms that engage in multiple
but similar investment strategies with firms that pursue multiple and divergent investment
strategies. The latter is more consonant with a growth-oriented asset gathering strategy that
caters to an investor preference for diversification.
The results reported in columns (5) to (8) of Table 7 indicate that firms managing diver-
gent strategies underperform firms managing correlated strategies. The coe cient estimates
20Inferences do not change when we exclude FIRST as an independent variable in the Table 7 regressions.
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on STRATCORR are positive and statistically significant at the one percent level across all
regression specifications. These findings dovetail with the asset gathering view.
3.4. Tests of hedge fund firm revenue
How does raising multiple funds a↵ect the total fee revenue that accrues to the firm man-
agement company? To investigate, we sort firms into five portfolios based on the number of
funds launched. Next, we evaluate the total firm fee revenue (management fee plus perfor-
mance fee) over the subsequent one-year period. Fund performance fee is calculated as per
the assumptions in Appendix A of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009).
We find that hedge fund management companies benefit significantly from launching
multiple funds or products. Multiple-product firms in portfolio 5 (firms with many funds)
harvest an annual fee revenue of US$25.50 million, which is US$21.68 million greater than
that harvested by the average single-product firm in portfolio 1 (firms with one fund). The
di↵erence in fee revenues is statistically significant at the one percent level.21 On aver-
age, firms in portfolio 5 manage US$866.44 million, while firms in portfolio 1 manage only
US$95.37 million. The AUM spread may therefore drive much of the fee revenue di↵erence.
To test whether the higher fee revenues of multiple-product firms are indeed by-products
of their greater AUMs, we perform a double sort on firm AUM and on the number of funds
launched. The results indicate that the multiple-product growth strategy engenders greater
fee revenues largely through its e↵ect on firm AUM. Once we control for firm AUM, the
spread in fee revenues between multiple- and single-product firms is typically insignificant.
The spread in fee revenues is only significant for the firms in the largest AUM quintile.
Taken together, these results suggest that hedge fund firms (not investors) benefit from
the multiple-product growth strategy. Unsurprisingly, we find that this has become the
dominant business model for hedge fund firms. At the start of our sample period, multiple-
product firms manage 47.14% of funds (by number) and 62.56% of industry assets. By the
21We obtain similar inferences when we sort based on the average pairwise correlation of the strategies of
the funds managed by the firm.
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end of the sample period, multiple-product firms manage 68.94% of funds (by number) and
77.19% of industry assets.
3.5. Event study
Do firms protect the performance of their first funds while simultaneously operating other
follow-on funds? To investigate, we first plot the monthly abnormal returns of the average
first fund 36 months before to 36 months after the launch of the first follow-on fund by the
same firm. To accommodate the 36-month window, the fund sample we analyze only includes
first funds whose firms raised a subsequent fund between January 1997 and December 2010,
and that report returns in the 24-month period before and in the 24-month period after the
launch of the follow-on fund.
The resultant graph in Figure 2 suggests that first fund performance deteriorates once
the firm launches a subsequent fund. The average annual first fund risk-adjusted return
prior to the follow-on fund launch is 10.83%, while the analogous return after the follow-
on fund launch is 5.48%. This implies that first fund performance deteriorates by 5.35%
once the firm launches another fund. In Figure 2, we also plot the AUM of the average
first fund over the same event window. We find that despite the deterioration in first fund
performance, the average first fund is able to increase its AUM by 51% from US$193m to
US$292m in the 36-month period after the launch of the first follow-on fund by the same
firm. This represents a substantial increase in AUM on the back of a 72% growth in AUM
from US$112m to US$193m over the 36-month period prior to the launch.
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 8 here]
To account for endogeneity concerns driven by observable di↵erences between firms that
launch follow-on funds and firms that do not, we match event hedge funds with non-event
hedge funds based on fund performance, AUM, and fee revenue in the 24-month pre-launch
period and conduct a di↵erence-in-di↵erences analysis. For example, in the fund abnormal
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return or alpha analysis, event funds are matched to non-event funds by minimizing the
sum of the absolute di↵erences in monthly fund abnormal return in the 24-month pre-launch
period. Table 8 reports di↵erences in fund return, alpha, AUM, and fee revenue before and
after the launch of the first follow-on fund relative to the matched sample. The results
reported in Panels A to D of Table 8 indicate that relative to the matched sample, first fund
annualized return and alpha fall by 1.92% after the launch of the first follow-on fund. At
the same time, relative to comparable funds, first fund AUM and fee revenue increase by
US$26.21m and US$0.80m per annum, respectively.
There are concerns that the aforementioned matching criterion may not be adequate. For
example, Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) show that hedge fund performance may be a function
of fund age. Therefore, we also match event hedge funds with non-event hedge funds based
on fund age, in addition to fund performance, AUM, or fee revenues. Specifically, in the fund
abnormal return analysis, event funds are matched to non-event funds by minimizing the
absolute di↵erence in calendar years since inception. If there are multiple matches based on
fund age, we choose the matching fund that minimizes the sum of the absolute di↵erences in
monthly fund abnormal return in the 24-month pre-launch period. The results largely survive
this modified matching algorithm. Relative to the matched sample based on fund age and
performance, first fund annualized return and alpha fall by 1.80% and 1.68%, respectively,
after the launch of the first follow-on fund.
Are the results specific to the launch of the first follow-on fund? That is, do the launches
of subsequent follow-on funds also coincide with deteriorations in the performance of the
first fund? To test, we redo the di↵erence-in-di↵erences analysis for the launch of the second
or later follow-on funds, and report the findings in Panels A to D of Table 9. The results
indicate that first fund performance deteriorates when a firm launches its second and later
follow-on funds as well, although the deteriorations tend to be smaller in magnitude for
each successive follow-on fund launched. Moreover, while first funds grow their AUMs and
fee revenues around the launch of each later follow-on fund, the increase is lower than that
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experienced by other matching first funds that do not launch later follow-on funds.
[Insert Table 9 here]
What drives the drop in first fund performance after a firm launches its first follow-on
fund? First, the first funds at firms that launch subsequent funds may be simply lucky and
their performance mean reverts once their luck runs out. Second, partners at firms that
launch follow-on funds may be busy managing those follow-on funds and cannot devote as
much of their time to driving the investment process at the first fund. Third, follow-on
funds may crowd out the investment opportunities at first funds, especially if the former
are engaged in the same strategies as the latter. We argue that the evidence of first fund
performance persistence around the launch of the first follow-on fund by the same firm
discussed in the next section is inconsistent with the first story.
To explore the second story, we divide first funds into first funds managed by the same
principals (group I) and di↵erent principals (group II) as those at the first follow-on funds
in the same firm, and redo the event study analysis. The results reported in Panels E to H
of Table 9 indicate that the performance deterioration for group I is greater than that for
group II. These results are consonant with the view that limited attention explains some of
the deterioration in first fund performance.
To test the third story, we stratify first funds into those that engage in the same strategies
(group III) and di↵erent strategies (group IV) as the first follow-on funds from the same firm,
and redo the event study analysis. The results reported in Panels I to L of Table 9 indicate
that the performance deterioration for group III is more pronounced than that for group IV.
These results are supportive of the view that the crowding out e↵ect explains part of the
deterioration in first fund performance.22
22The results reported in Panel L of Table 9 suggest that first funds in group IV are able to grow their fee
revenues more than do first funds in group III. Specifically, based on the fees reported in the first row of the
above-mentioned panel, first funds in the di↵erent strategy group (i.e., group IV) grow their fee revenues by
US$(10.09  8.22  (6.20  5.35))m or US$1.02m per annum (t-statistic = 7.16) more than do first funds in
the identical strategy group (i.e., group III). We also conduct the analogous analysis for firm fee revenues as
opposed to first fund fee revenues. We find that firms in the di↵erent strategy group grow their fee revenues
by US$0.83m per annum (t-statistic = 2.20) more than do firms in the identical strategy group.
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3.6. Intra-firm performance spillovers
Are firms with first funds that delivered stellar performance skilled or simply lucky? One
view is that these firms are simply growing capital opportunistically in the wake of a lucky
run at the first fund. However, that view necessarily calls into question the rationality of
hedge fund investors who subscribe to the first and follow-on funds launched by such firms.
To investigate, we test the relation between first fund performance prior to the launch of
the first follow-on fund and the performance of the follow-on fund post inception. Specifically,
we estimate the following regression on first follow-on fund performance:
NFIRSTALPHAim,m+11 = a+ bFIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 + clog(NFIRSTSIZEim)








hyY EARDUMym + ✏im, (4)
where m is the first follow-on fund inception month, NFIRSTALPHAim,m+11
is follow-on fund abnormal return averaged over the 12-month post-inception pe-
riod, FIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 is first fund abnormal return averaged over the 12-
month pre-inception period, NFIRSTSIZEim is follow-on fund size in US$m at
fund inception, NFIRSTMGTFEEi is follow-on fund management fee in per-
centage, NFIRSTPERFFEEi is follow-on fund performance fee in percentage,
NFIRSTNOTICEi is follow-on fund redemption notification period in months,
NFIRSTSTY LEDUMki is follow-on fund style dummy for style k, and Y EARDUM
y
m
is follow-on fund inception year dummy for year y. We estimate the univariate version of the
regression as well as two other versions where fund abnormal returns are averaged over 24
and 36 months instead of over 12 months. Statistical inferences are based on White (1980)
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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The coe cient estimates reported in columns (1) to (6) of Table A2 in the Internet
Appendix suggest that fund risk-adjusted performance persists within hedge fund firms. A
one percentage point increase in first fund monthly alpha in the 12-month period prior to the
launch of the first follow-on fund is associated with a 13.6 basis point increase in follow-on
fund monthly alpha in the 12-month post launch period that is statistically significant at
the one percent level. After controlling for other variables that can explain follow-on fund
performance, the coe cient estimate on first fund alpha decreases by about a third but is still
statistically significant at the one percent level. We obtain similar results when investigating
alpha or abnormal returns averaged over 24 months. When abnormal returns are averaged
over 36 months, the coe cient estimates on FIRSTALPHA are significantly weaker and
not always statistically distinguishable from zero at the five percent level.
To investigate persistence in first fund performance, we estimate the following regression:
FIRSTALPHAim,m+11 = a+ bFIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 + clog(FIRSTSIZEim 1)








hyY EARDUMym + ✏im, (5)
where m is the first follow-on fund inception month, FIRSTSIZEim 1 is first fund size in
US$m, FIRSTMGTFEEi is first fund management fee in percentage, FIRSTPERFFEEi
is first fund performance fee in percentage, FIRSTNOTICEi is first fund redemption noti-
fication period in months, FIRSTSTY LEDUMki is first fund style dummy for style k, and
Y EARDUMym is follow-on fund inception year dummy for year y. We estimate the univari-
ate version of the regression as well as two other versions where fund abnormal returns are
averaged over 24 and 36 months instead of over 12 months.
The coe cient estimates reported in columns (7) to (12) of Table A2 indicate that first
fund performance persists around the launch of the first follow-on fund. A one percentage
25
point increase in first fund monthly alpha in the 12-month period prior to follow-on fund
launch is associated with a 12.6 basis point increase in first fund monthly alpha in the 12-
month period post follow-on fund launch. The coe cient estimate is statistically significant
at the one percent level, and prevails after controlling for the other factors that explain first
fund performance. In addition, the findings are robust to extending the evaluation horizon
to 24 or 36 months. Therefore, firms with stellar first fund performance are not simply lucky.
Investors who subscribe to the first and follow-on funds managed by such firms are rationally
responding to the view that they employ talented investment professionals.
3.7. Blowback e↵ect
Are there constraints on the amount of capital that hedge fund firms can raise when adopting
a multiple-product growth strategy? We test for evidence of a feedback or blowback e↵ect
from follow-on funds to first funds by estimating the following regression on first fund flow:
FIRSTFLOWim = a+ bFIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 + cFIRSTFLOWim 12,m 1
+ dFIRSTV OLim 12,m 1 + eFIRSTHWMi
+ fNFIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 + gNFIRSTFLOWim 12,m 1







oyY EARDUMym + ✏im, (6)
where FIRSTFLOWim is flow into first fund i on month m, FIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 is
first fund i abnormal return averaged over the previous 12 months, FIRSTV OLim 12,m 1 is
standard deviation of first fund i abnormal return estimated over the previous 12 months,
FIRSTHWMi is first fund i high water-mark indicator, NFIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 is
follow-on fund abnormal return averaged over all follow-on funds managed by the firm that
launched fund i and averaged over the previous 12 months, NFIRSTFLOWim 12,m 1 is
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follow-on fund flow averaged over all follow-on funds managed by the firm that launched
fund i and averaged over the previous 12 months, NFIRSTV OLim 12,m 1 is standard de-
viation of average follow-on fund i abnormal return estimated over the previous 12 months,
FIRSTSTY LEDUMki is first fund i style dummy for style k, and Y EARDUM
y
m is year
dummy for year y. Statistical inferences are based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level. We also estimate regressions with look
back periods of 24 and 36 months.
The results reported in Table 10 indicate that there is a significant blowback e↵ect from
follow-on funds to first funds. Poor follow-on past performance is a reliable harbinger of
lower flows into first funds. The impact of follow-on fund alpha is statistically significant
at the one percent level when abnormal returns are averaged over the last 12 or 24 months.
Moreover, the impact of follow-on fund alpha is economically significant. For alpha evaluated
over the last 12 months, it is about 17.09% as large as the impact of first fund alpha on first
fund flow. These results suggest that investors rationally impose constraints on the ability
of hedge fund firms to grow via the launch of multiple products. Firms that embark on this
strategy will need to balance quantity with quality when launching new funds.
[Insert Table 10 here]
3.8. Endogeneity
Does the endogeneity of a firm’s growth strategy engender the underperformance of follow-on
versus first funds? Systematic di↵erences may exist between firms that conceive follow-on
funds (multiple-product firms) and those that do not (single-product firms). These dif-
ferences could impact both the propensity to launch follow-on funds and the performance
spread between first and follow-on funds. The multivariate regression methodology that we
employ in Section 3.2 allows us to ameliorate concerns that observed di↵erences between
funds managed by single- and multiple-product firms explain our results.
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Still, the multivariate regressions leave open the possibility that unobserved di↵erences
between funds managed by single- and multiple-product firms might simultaneously a↵ect
the decision to embark on a multiple-product growth strategy and the first versus follow-on
fund performance spread. To address this concern, we conduct an instrumental variables
analysis. The instrument that we use, i.e., firm strategy flow at founding, is motivated by
Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist’s (2015) choice of venture capital supply at founding to
instrument for firm listing status. Firm strategy flow at founding is the strategy flow of the
first fund conceived by the firm in the one-year period prior to firm inception.23 We argue
that the ability to attract capital at inception allows a first fund to grow quickly and sets
the stage for the launch of follow-on funds later. The first-stage results in column one of
Table A3 in the Internet Appendix confirm this prediction. The supply of capital around
the time of firm founding is a negative and significant predictor of a firm’s single-product
status, proxied by FIRST, with an F-statistic of 20.52.24
In columns (2) and (3) of Table A3, we report the second stage results for the fund
return and alpha equations, respectively. After instrumenting for first fund status or FIRST
with firm strategy flow at inception, first funds continue to outperform follow-on funds. The
results reported in columns (4) to (6) of Table A3 indicate that the fund launch chronology
results are also robust to adjusting for endogeneity.
4. Robustness tests
In this section, we present a medley of robustness tests to ascertain the strength of our
empirical results.
23Specifically, Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) use as their instrument the total number of firms
receiving first-round venture capital funding in a firm’s headquarter state two years after a firm was funded.
We use firm strategy flow in the one-year period before firm inception as an instrument since we seek to
explain fund launch chronology status for all periods post firm inception. We obtain similar inferences when
we use firm strategy flow during the two-year period before inception.
24For single-fund firms, FIRST is always equal to one. For multiple-fund firms, the probability that FIRST
equals to one in any month is a decreasing function of the number of follow-on funds launched by the firm
that report returns that month.
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4.1. Backfill bias
First funds may backfill their returns more than do follow-on funds. In response to such
concerns, we confine the analysis to TASS and HFR funds for which we have the date that
the fund listed on the databases (only available in TASS and HFR). Next, we redo the
baseline Table 4 portfolio sort for those returns at or after the respective fund listing date.
As shown in Panel A of Table 11, our results are robust to controlling for backfill bias in
this fashion. Inferences also remain unchanged when, as an alternative, we remove the first
24 months of returns for all funds to adjust for backfill and incubation bias.
[Insert Table 11 here]
4.2. Serial correlation
Serial correlation in fund returns could arise from linear interpolation of prices for in-
frequently traded securities, the use of smoothed broker dealer quotes, or deliberate
performance-smoothing behavior. This could inflate some of the test statistics that we use
to make inferences. To allay such concerns, we unsmooth fund returns using the algorithm
of Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and redo the Table 4 portfolio sort. The results re-
ported in Panel B of Table 11 indicate that the findings are not driven by serial correlation.
We also redo the Table 5 regressions with fund returns adjusted for serial correlation. The
coe cient estimates reported in Panel A of Table A4 in the Internet Appendix indicate that
the findings are also not by-products of serial correlation.
4.3. Pre-fee returns
Hedge fund returns are reported net of fees. If first funds charge lower fees than do follow-on
funds, this may explain the outperformance of the former. To check, we back out pre-fee
fund returns. As shown in Panel C of Table 11, the baseline portfolio sort spreads are even
greater when we analyze pre-fee fund returns.
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4.4. Dynamic risk exposures
One concern is that the beta loadings of the fund portfolios might not stay constant over
time. As a result, the risk-adjustment for the baseline portfolio sort might not be accurate.
To account for dynamic factor loadings, we calculate the factor loadings using a rolling
36-month window and use those factor loadings to calculate abnormal returns one month
forward. The results, presented in Panel D of Table 11, indicate that our findings are robust
to catering for dynamic risk exposures.
4.5. Additional risk factors
Relative to follow-on funds, first funds could be loading up more on some omitted risk factor
that did well over the sample period. Hence, we augment the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model
with (i) an emerging markets factor derived from the MSCI Emerging Markets Index return,
(ii) the out-of-the-money (henceforth OTM) S&P 500 call and put option-based factors from
the Agarwal and Naik (2004) model, and (iii) the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity
factor, and redo the Table 4 portfolio sort. The results presented in Panels E to G of Table
11 indicate that our baseline findings are not driven by the presence of omitted risk factors.25
4.6. Fund termination
There are concerns that because funds that drop out from the database could have terminated
their operations, the portfolio alphas are biased upward. Edelman, Fung, and Hsieh (2013)
find that returns of funds after they dropped out of the databases do not di↵er materially
from returns of funds that remain in the databases. Nonetheless, to allay such concerns,
we assume that, for the month after a fund drops out of the database, its return is –10%.
Thereafter, money is reallocated to the remaining funds in the portfolio. As shown in Panel
25Inferences do not change when we augment the Fung and Hsieh model with the emerging markets factor,
the OTM call and put option-based factors, and the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor, and use
the resultant 11-factor model to adjust for risk exposure in our portfolio sorts.
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H of Table 11, the results are robust to this adjustment. We also experiment with more
extreme termination returns of –20% and –30%, and obtain qualitatively similar results.
4.7. Subsample analysis
To understand how the outperformance of first funds varies over time, we split the sample
period into two sub-periods: January 1994 to December 2003 and January 2004 to December
2013. Next, we redo the Table 4 portfolio sort for each sub-period. The results in Panels I
and J of Table 11 indicate that our findings are stronger in the first sub-period than in the
second sub-period. Nonetheless, the alpha of the spread between portfolios A and D is still
economically and statistically significant for the second sub-period.
4.8. Duplicate share classes
In our analysis, we exclude duplicate share classes. One concern is that including duplicate
share classes may materially a↵ect the results. To test, we redo the baseline portfolio sort and
fund performance regressions after including duplicate share classes. The results reported
in Panel K of Table 11 and Panel B of Table A4 in the Internet Appendix indicate that the
findings are qualitatively unchanged when we include duplicate share classes.
4.9. Firm fixed e↵ects
The results from the regressions on fund performance in Table 5 may be driven by perfor-
mance di↵erences between funds in single-product firms and follow-on funds in multiple-
product firms, and between first and follow-on funds in multiple-product firms. To ascertain
that they are not driven purely by the former, we include firm fixed e↵ects and redo the
baseline regressions. The results presented in Panel C of Table A4 in the Internet Appendix
suggest that the findings in Table 5 are at least partly driven by performance di↵erences
between first and follow-on funds from multiple-product firms.
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4.10. Firm size
Firm size may drive the underperformance of follow-on funds. To test, we include the
logarithm of last month’s firm AUM as an additional independent variable and re-estimate
the baseline fund performance regressions. The results, reported in Panel D of Table A4 in
the Internet Appendix, are largely robust to controlling for firm size.
5. Conclusion
The empirical results in this paper enrich our understanding of capital accumulation in the
hedge fund industry. We show that there exists spillover e↵ects from first to follow-on funds
launched by hedge fund firms. Stellar first fund performance allows hedge fund firms to
raise follow-on funds that charge higher fees, set more onerous redemption terms, and at-
tract more capital. The spillover e↵ects in turn lead hedge fund firms to focus more on the
performance of their first funds. Consequently, first funds outperform follow-on funds after
adjusting for risk. In line with an agency explanation, the performance spread between first
and follow-on funds is strongest for funds with poor incentive alignment, i.e., funds that
charge low performance fees relative to management fees, feature no manager co-investment,
operate far below their high water marks, and attract flows that are insensitive to perfor-
mance. Also consistent with the agency view, the strategy of leveraging on successful first
fund performance to launch multiple follow-on funds hurts investors but benefits fund man-
agers. Multiple-product firms underperform single-product firms while harvesting greater
fee revenues. Investors respond to this growth strategy by redeeming from first funds when
follow-on funds underperform. Therefore, firms cannot completely forsake quality when em-
barking on a multiple-product growth strategy that emphasizes quantity. Ironically, while
growing the hedge fund franchise by launching multiple products hurts performance ex-post,
the prospect of generating substantial fee revenues through a multiple-product hedge fund
firm may well incentivize outperformance ex-ante. Nevertheless, the findings in this paper
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suggest that judicious investors should focus on the first funds launched by hedge fund firms
when allocating capital and eschew firms that launch multiple follow-on funds.26
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Fig 1: Cumulative abnormal return of funds sorted on fund inception date. Portfolios of hedge funds are constructed by sorting funds based on fund
inception date. For each hedge fund firm, the first fund is the first fund launched by the firm. The first fund portfolio is the equal-weighted return of the first
funds across firms. The other portfolios are defined analogously. Cumulative abnormal return is the cumulative difference between a portfolio's excess return
and its factor loadings multiplied by risk factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. Factor loadings are estimated over the entire sample
period.  The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013.
Fig 2: Average monthly abnormal return and assets under management of first funds before and after launch of the first follow-on fund
by the same firm. Monthly abnormal return is the difference between a portfolio's excess return and its factor loadings multiplied by risk 
factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. Factor loadings are estimated over the entire sample period. For each
hedge fund firm, the first fund is the first fund launched by the firm. First fund abnormal returns and assets under management (AUM)
are averaged across firms. The sample includes firms that launch at least one follow-on fund from January 1997 to December 2013.
Month 0 denotes the inception month for the first follow-on fund managed by the same firm. The abnormal return graph is represented
by the solid line (y-axis on the left) while the AUM graph is represented by the dashed line (y-axis on the right). The sample period is
from January 1994 to December 2013.
Total funds Dead funds 1st funds 2nd-5th funds 6th-10th funds 11th-20th funds Return months
Investment strategy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Commodity Trading Advisors 1,507 330 813 537 95 44 89,017
Emerging Markets 833 371 320 306 85 46 57,777
Event Driven 1,162 329 523 412 125 68 87,973
Global Macro 1,949 657 857 727 151 84 117,580
Long Only 222 149 62 72 20 18 17,510
Equity Long/Short 5,341 1,578 2,657 1,772 478 250 377,870
Market Neutral 440 96 184 160 46 35 27,780
Multi-Strategy 2,222 1,100 839 602 191 184 141,800
Relative Value 2,459 815 1,069 880 265 116 152,050
Sector 309 127 132 102 24 25 22,034
Short Bias 34 5 19 13 2 0 2,868
Others 350 76 191 124 27 8 18,277
Total 16,828 5,633 7,666 5,707 1,509 878 1,112,500
Commodity Trading Advisors 1,455 315 804 516 89 32 85,971
Emerging Markets 717 306 311 272 63 37 52,458
Event Driven 1,053 301 497 364 105 54 80,807
Global Macro 1,850 638 841 663 146 74 112,830
Long Only 193 130 63 65 20 15 16,065
Equity Long/Short 4,922 1,498 2,576 1,555 423 208 357,240
Market Neutral 389 86 177 141 37 21 24,939
Multi-Strategy 2,139 1,077 833 554 174 178 137,370
Relative Value 2,268 744 1,043 799 221 98 142,980
Sector 276 107 128 89 23 22 19,967
Short Bias 31 4 18 12 1 0 2,626
Others 314 63 188 102 21 3 16,780
Total 15,607 5,269 7,479 5,132 1,323 742 1,050,000
Panel B: Without duplicate share classes
Table 1
Summary statistics
The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. Funds are grouped according to their primary investment strategy. The list of strategies
follows Joenväärä, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2018) and includes Commodity Trading Advisors, Emerging Markets, Event Driven, Global Macro,
Long Only, Equity Long/Short, Market Neutral, Multi-Strategy, Relative Value, Sector, Short Bias, and Others.
Follow-on funds
Panel A: Full sample
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)


















Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R -squared 0.019 0.025 0.040 0.019 0.026 0.041
Number of Observations 38,455 9,285 3,504 39,744 9,741 3,693


















Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R -squared 0.021 0.028 0.040 0.021 0.029 0.041
Number of Observations 37,220 9,056 3,406 38,362 9,490 3,591


















Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R -squared 0.024 0.031 0.045 0.024 0.033 0.046
Number of Observations 35,370 8,579 3,231 36,002 8,794 3,321
Table 2
Logit regressions on probability of hedge fund launch
Logit regressions are estimated on the probability each year of launching a fund by each hedge fund firm. The dependent variable is LAUNCH which takes a value of
one if a firm launches at least one fund in a specific year and a value of zero, otherwise. The independent variables include FIRSTALPHA , SECONDALPHA , 
THIRDALPHA , FIRSTRET , SECONDRET , and THIRDRET , where FIRSTALPHA is the alpha of the first fund conceived by the firm averaged over the last x 
months prior to that year, SECONDALPHA  is the alpha of the second (or first follow-on) fund conceived by the firm averaged over the same period, THIRDALPHA  is 
the alpha of the third (or second follow-on) fund conceived by the firm averaged over the same period, and FIRSTRET , SECONDRET , and THIRDRET are the fund
return equivalents of FIRSTALPHA , SECONDALPHA , and THIRDALPHA , respectively. The regressions include controls for calendar year fixed effects. The z -
statistics, derived from robust standard errors clustered by firm, are in parentheses. Marginal effects are in brackets. In Panels A, B, and C, the look back period x 
equals 12, 24, and 36 months, respectively. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable: LAUNCH
Panel C: Regressions with monthly alphas or returns averaged over the last 36 months
Panel B: Regressions with monthly alphas or returns averaged over the last 24 months









Follow-on fund  
monthly flow
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FIRSTALPHA 0.007 0.257** 0.618 1.121** 0.125*
(0.72) (2.84) (1.65) (2.92) (2.39)
NFIRSTALPHA 0.021* 0.342** 0.722 0.987 0.151









Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R -squared 0.050 0.136 0.099 0.113 0.043
Number of Observations 4,757 4,757 4,757 4,757 290,184
FIRSTALPHA 0.01 0.323** 1.276** 1.776** 0.277**
(0.91) (3.46) (2.60) (3.54) (3.75)
NFIRSTALPHA 0.019 0.341** 1.012 1.166 0.168









Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R -squared 0.047 0.139 0.101 0.114 0.037
Number of Observations 4,605 4,605 4,605 4,605 284,420
FIRSTALPHA 0.015 0.415** 1.447* 1.890** 0.397**
(1.21) (4.06) (2.58) (3.29) (4.31)
NFIRSTALPHA 0.024* 0.278* 1.195 1.097 0.174









Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R -squared 0.046 0.139 0.102 0.111 0.035
Number of Observations 4,455 4,455 4,455 4,455 276,876
Panel C: Regressions with monthly alphas averaged over the last 36 months
Table 3
Regressions on follow-on fund attributes and flow
Regressions are estimated on the fees, redemption terms, and flows for follow-on funds managed by each hedge fund firm. For each firm, we
distinguish between the first fund launched and other follow-on funds. In the fund attribute regressions, the independent variables include
FIRSTALPHA and NFIRSTALPHA , where FIRSTALPHA is the alpha of the first fund within the same firm averaged over the last x months prior to
the launch of the follow-on fund and NFIRSTALPHA is the alpha of the other follow-on funds within the same firm averaged over the last x  months 
prior to the launch of the follow-on fund. In the fund flow regressions, the independent variables include FIRSTALPHA , NFIRSTALPHA , and
FUNDALPHA , FUNDFLOW , FUNDVOL , and FUNDHWM , where FUNDALPHA is own fund alpha averaged over the last x months, FUNDFLOW 
is own fund flow averaged over the last x months, FUNDVOL is standard deviation of own fund abnormal returns estimated over the last x  months, 
and FUNDHWM is own fund high-water mark indicator. Fund management fee and performance fee are in percentage, while fund redemption
period and notice period are in business days. The regressions include controls for follow-on fund investment style and year fixed effects. Inception
year fixed effects are used for the regressions on follow-on fund characteristics while calendar year fixed effects are used in the regressions on follow-
on fund flow. The t -statistics, derived from robust standard errors that are clustered at the fund level, are in parentheses. In Panels A, B, and C, the
look back period x equals 12, 24, and 36 months, respectively. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5%
level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variables
Panel A: Regressions with monthly alphas averaged over the last 12 months
















































Fund portfolio (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Full fund sample
Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.99** 5.75 5.28** 6.67 0.27** 0.15** 0.03 0.20** -0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.70
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th funds launched) 6.35** 4.31 3.49** 3.56 0.26** 0.14** 0.08* 0.25** -0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.61
Portfolio C (6th to 10th funds launched) 5.94** 3.61 2.84* 2.44 0.28** 0.13** 0.09* 0.28** -0.01 0.01* 0.00 0.55
Portfolio D (11th to 20th funds launched) 5.20** 2.91 1.82 1.36 0.25** 0.14** 0.11* 0.34** -0.02 0.01** 0.00 0.48
Spread (A - B) 1.63** 5.01 1.79** 5.68 0.01 0.01 -0.05**-0.06** 0.00 -0.01** -0.01 0.14
Spread (A - C) 2.04** 3.62 2.43** 4.39 -0.01 0.02 -0.06**-0.09** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.07
Spread (A - D) 2.79** 3.41 3.45** 4.29 0.02 0.01 -0.08* -0.15** 0.01** -0.01 0.00 0.07
Panel B: Funds with AUM ≥ US$20m
Portfolio A (1st funds) 6.27** 4.37 3.44** 4.12 0.27** 0.17** 0.04 0.21** -0.01 0.01* 0.00 0.69
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th funds launched) 5.02** 3.39 2.13* 2.14 0.24 0.14** 0.08* 0.28** -0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.59
Portfolio C (6th to 10th funds launched) 4.31* 2.28 1.17 0.83 0.28 0.15** 0.09 0.30** -0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.45
Portfolio D (11th to 20th funds launched) 2.61 1.48 -0.63 -0.47 0.23 0.15** 0.15** 0.32** -0.02 0.02** 0.00 0.43
Spread (A - B) 1.24** 2.90 1.31** 3.23 0.02 0.03* -0.04* -0.08** 0.00 -0.01** -0.01 0.16
Spread (A - C) 1.96* 1.96 2.27* 2.40 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.09* 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.05
Spread (A - D) 3.66** 3.82 4.07** 4.46 0.03 0.02 -0.11**-0.11** 0.00 -0.02** 0.00 0.06
Table 4
Sorts on hedge fund inception date
Every month, hedge funds are sorted based on their launch date within each hedge fund firm. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF ), Wilshire
small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC ), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. ten-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the
ten-year bond (BD10RET ), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over ten-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY ), 
bond PTFS (PTFSBD ), currency PTFS (PTFSFX ), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM ), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t -
statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. Panel A reports results for the full 
sample of hedge funds while Panel B reports results for funds with AUM ≥ US$20m. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FIRST 0.146** 0.157** 0.131** 0.140**
(10.22) (10.97) (7.33) (8.14)
CHRONO -0.011** -0.014** -0.021** -0.022**
(-13.98) (-16.51) (-3.49) (-4.90)
Log(SIZE) -0.037** -0.018** -0.043** -0.022** -0.039** -0.020** -0.043** -0.022**
(-8.78) (-4.25) (-3.94) (-2.65) (-9.20) (-4.62) (-3.97) (-2.69)
MGTFEE 0.033** 0.051** 0.037 0.054* 0.036** 0.057** 0.041 0.060**
(2.81) (4.16) (1.68) (2.51) (3.11) (4.66) (1.84) (2.77)
PERFFEE 0.009** 0.019** 0.008* 0.014** 0.008** 0.018** 0.007** 0.014**
(7.56) (14.53) (2.30) (5.99) (6.91) (13.81) (2.25) (5.97)
NOTICE 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002**
(2.90) (3.12) (3.47) (3.69) (2.87) (3.06) (3.47) (3.62)
AGE -0.131** -0.158** -0.192** -0.254** -0.137** -0.173** -0.194** -0.261**
(-8.31) (-9.87) (-4.30) (-5.56) (-8.67) (-10.69) (-4.35) (-5.70)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Adj R -squared 0.028 0.012 0.088 0.051 0.028 0.012 0.089 0.052
Number of Observations 745,903 686,277 3,121 3,364 745,903 686,277 3,121 3,364
Table 5
Regressions on hedge fund performance
OLS and Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund performance. The dependent variable is hedge fund monthly return (RETURN ) 
or alpha (ALPHA ). ALPHA is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. FIRST is an indicator variable that takes a value of one when a fund is
the first fund launched by a firm and a value of zero otherwise. CHRONO is fund launch order within the firm. SIZE is last month fund assets under management in US$m.
MGTFEE is fund management fee in percentage. PERFFEE is fund performance fee in percentage. NOTICE is fund redemption notice period in months. AGE is fund age
in decades. The regressions include controls for fund investment style fixed effects and calendar year fixed effects (for the OLS regressions). The t -statistics are in
parentheses. For the OLS regressions, they are derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund, and for the Fama-MacBeth regressions, they are derived from
Newey and West (1987) standard errors with a three-month lag. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at
the 1% level.
Dependent variable
OLS Fama-MacBeth OLS Fama-MacBeth
RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FIRST 0.040 0.018 0.107* 0.039 0.120** 0.114** 0.155** 0.123**
(0.77) (0.34) (2.07) (1.06) (3.50) (3.26) (3.25) (3.13)
FIRST 0.164** 0.131** 0.133** 0.095** 0.229** 0.227** 0.146** 0.151**
(7.19) (5.76) (5.41) (4.30) (8.51) (8.63) (3.85) (4.62)
FIRST 0.125** 0.097** 0.145** 0.099** 0.139** 0.160** 0.112** 0.126**
(5.33) (4.54) (5.17) (4.74) (5.58) (6.66) (4.50) (5.46)
FIRST 0.083** 0.113** 0.072* 0.088** 0.138** 0.159** 0.144** 0.157**
(2.95) (4.65) (2.37) (2.95) (4.52) (5.95) (3.16) (3.80)
Table 6
Regressions on hedge fund performance for funds stratified by incentive alignment
OLS and Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund performance for funds stratified by proxies for incentive alignment. The
dependent variable is hedge fund monthly return (RETURN ) or alpha (ALPHA ). ALPHA is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. FIRST is an
indicator variable that takes a value of one when a fund is the first fund launched by a firm and a value of zero otherwise. The independent variables are MGTFEE , 
PERFFEE , NOTICE , log(SIZE), and AGE . MGTFEE is fund management fee in percentage. PERFFEE is fund performance fee in percentage. NOTICE is fund redemption
notice period in months. SIZE is last month fund assets under management in US$m. AGE is fund age in decades. The OLS regressions include controls for fund investment
style and calendar year fixed effects. The t -statistics are in parentheses. For the OLS regressions, they are derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund, and
for the Fama-MacBeth regressions, they are derived from Newey and West (1987) standard errors with a three-month lag. The coefficient estimates on the control variables
are omitted for brevity. In Panel A, funds are sorted based on manager personal capital. In Panel B, funds are sorted based on whether their weights on performance fee, i.e.,
performance fee/management fee are higher or lower than the median that year. In Panel C, funds are sorted based on whether their manager total deltas (Agarwal, Daniel,
and Naik, 2009) computed at the end of the previous year are higher or lower than the median. In Panel D, funds are sorted based on whether their flow-performance
sensitivities estimated over the last 36 months are higher or lower than the median. Columns 1 to 4 report results for funds with stronger incentive alignment. Columns 5 to 8
report results for funds with weaker incentive alignment. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1%
level.
OLS Fama-MacBeth OLS Fama-MacBeth
Dependent variable
Panel A: Funds sorted by personal capital
Panel B: Funds sorted by performance fee to management fee ratio 
Panel C: Funds sorted by past manager total delta
Personal capital Without personal capital
High performance fees relative to management fees Low performance fees relative to management fees
Panel D: Funds sorted by past 36-month flow-performance sensitivity
High flow-performance sensitivity Low flow-performance sensitivity
High manager total delta Low manager total delta
RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NFUNDS -0.006** -0.009** -0.009* -0.011**
(-10.45) (-13.85) (-2.12) (-3.81)
STRATCORR 0.268** 0.267** 0.274** 0.244**
(4.85) (4.62) (3.21) (4.02)
FIRST 0.103** 0.096** 0.089** 0.083** 0.109** 0.120** 0.095** 0.104**
(6.93) (6.43) (5.33) (5.35) (6.75) (7.37) (4.73) (5.74)
Log(SIZE ) -0.037** -0.017** -0.041** -0.02* -0.036** -0.017** -0.041** -0.020*
(-8.64) (-4.04) (-3.78) (-2.42) (-8.36) (-3.82) (-3.79) (-2.41)
MGTFEE 0.037** 0.057** 0.041 0.061** 0.033** 0.051** 0.038 0.054*
(3.15) (4.71) (1.85) (2.78) (2.82) (4.16) (1.69) (2.47)
PERFFEE 0.008** 0.017** 0.007* 0.014** 0.009** 0.019** 0.007* 0.014**
(6.67) (13.53) (2.15) (5.80) (7.37) (14.43) (2.20) (5.88)
NOTICE 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002**
(2.73) (2.91) (3.29) (3.40) (2.78) (3.02) (3.30) (3.52)
AGE -0.130** -0.156** -0.181** -0.241** -0.126** -0.153** -0.187** -0.249**
(-8.26) (-9.83) (-4.13) (-5.43) (-8.09) (-9.65) (-4.11) (-5.39)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Adj R -squared 0.028 0.012 0.089 0.053 0.028 0.012 0.089 0.051
Number of Observations 745,903 686,277 3,121 3,364 745,865 686,239 3,121 3,364
Table 7
Regressions on hedge fund performance with firm variables
OLS and Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund performance. The dependent variable is hedge
fund monthly return (RETURN ) or alpha (ALPHA ). ALPHA is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model.
NFUNDS is the number of funds launched by the firm. STRATCORR is the average pairwise correlation of the strategies that the fund's firm
engages in. FIRST is an indicator variable that takes a value of one when a fund is the first fund launched by a firm and a value of zero
otherwise. SIZE is last month fund assets under management in US$m. MGTFEE is fund management fee in percentage. PERFFEE is fund
performance fee in percentage. NOTICE is fund redemption notice period in months. AGE is fund age in decades. The regressions include
controls for fund investment style fixed effects and calendar year fixed effects (for the OLS regressions). The t -statistics are in parentheses.
For the OLS regressions, they are derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund, while for the Fama-MacBeth regressions,
they are derived from Newey and West (1987) standard errors with a three-month lag. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 





Difference (after - 
before)
t -statistic of 
difference
Fund attribute (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: First fund return 
Fund return (percent / month), treatment group 1.41 0.81 -0.60** -13.17
Fund return (percent / month), control group 1.17 0.72 -0.45** -9.83
Difference in return (percent / month) 0.25 0.09 -0.16** -4.24
Panel B: First fund alpha
Fund alpha (percent / month), treatment group 0.90 0.46 -0.45** -11.27
Fund alpha (percent / month), control group 0.64 0.35 -0.29** -7.52
Difference in alpha (percent / month) 0.26 0.10 -0.16** -4.36
Panel C: First fund AUM
Fund AUM (US$m), treatment group 140.31 245.93 105.62** 59.97
Fund AUM (US$m), control group 137.90 217.31 79.41** 59.77
Difference in AUM (US$m) 2.41 28.61 26.21** 14.16
Panel D: First fund fee revenue
Fund fee revenue (US$m / year), treatment group 5.71 9.01 3.30** 44.88
Fund fee revenue (US$m / year), control group 5.76 8.26 2.50** 23.52
Difference in fee revenue (US$m / year) -0.05 0.75 0.80** 6.97
Panel E: First fund return 
Fund return (percent / month), treatment group 1.41 0.81 -0.60 -13.17
Fund return (percent / month), control group 1.11 0.66 -0.46 -11.47
Difference in return (percent / month) 0.30 0.15 -0.15** -3.70
Panel F: First fund alpha
Fund alpha (percent / month), treatment group 0.90 0.46 -0.45 -11.27
Fund alpha (percent / month), control group 0.63 0.32 -0.30 -10.48
Difference in alpha (percent / month) 0.27 0.13 -0.14** -3.62
Panel G: First fund AUM
Fund AUM (US$m), treatment group 140.31 245.93 105.62 59.97
Fund AUM (US$m), control group 117.34 197.70 80.36 62.07
Difference in AUM (US$m) 22.97 48.22 25.25** 15.59
Panel H: First fund fee revenue
Fund fee revenue (US$m / year), treatment group 5.71 9.01 3.30 44.88
Fund fee revenue (US$m / year), control group 4.27 7.40 3.14 31.08
Difference in fee revenue (US$m / year) 1.44 1.61 0.16 1.59
Table 8
Event study with differences-in-differences analysis
This table reports results from an event study analysis of first fund attributes around the launch of the first follow-on fund by the same
hedge fund firm. First funds are the first funds launched by each hedge fund firm. The fund attributes analyzed include fund return, alpha,
AUM, and fee revenue. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. Event month is the month that the
first follow-on fund is launched. The period 'before' is the 36-month period before the event month and the period 'after' is the 36-month
period after the event month. To be included in the analysis, a first fund must survive at least 24 months before and after the event month.
In Panels A, B, C, and D, funds in the control group are matched to funds in the treatment group based on fund return, alpha, AUM, or
fee revenue in the 24-month pre-event period. For example, in the fund return analysis, funds in the control group are matched to funds in
the treatment group by minimizing the sum of the absolute differences in monthly fund return in the 24-month pre-event period. In Panels
E, F, G, and H, funds in the control group are first matched to funds in the treatment group based on minimizing the absolute difference in
calendar years since inception. Next, funds in the closest calendar year group are matched to the treatment group based on fund return,
alpha, AUM, or fee revenue in the 24-month pre-event period. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The sample
period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Panels E to H: Control funds matched based on fund age and monthly returns, alpha, AUM, or fee revenue








t -statistic of 
difference
Fund attribute (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panels A to D: Launch of the second or later follow-on fund
Panel A: First fund return 
Fund return (percent / month), treatment group 1.31 0.75 -0.56** -9.32 1.14 0.70 -0.44** -7.16
Fund return (percent / month), control group 1.11 0.72 -0.39** -7.80 1.09 0.69 -0.40** -8.98
Difference in return (percent / month) 0.20 0.03 -0.17** -4.07 0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.94
Panel B: First fund alpha
Fund alpha (percent / month), treatment group 0.85 0.39 -0.47** -10.10 0.64 0.29 -0.36** -6.31
Fund alpha (percent / month), control group 0.68 0.36 -0.32** -9.40 0.57 0.33 -0.24** -4.88
Difference in alpha (percent / month) 0.17 0.03 -0.15** -4.00 0.08 -0.04 -0.12** -3.19
Panel C: First fund AUM
Fund AUM (US$m), treatment group 200.00 300.14 100.14** 109.56 295.69 445.32 149.63** 43.64
Fund AUM (US$m), control group 198.15 319.17 121.02** 39.26 295.35 504.06 208.71** 28.83
Difference in AUM (US$m) 1.85 -19.03 -20.88** -7.07 0.34 -58.74 -59.08** -5.82
Panel D: First fund fee revenue
Fund fee revenue (US$m / year), treatment group 8.36 11.47 3.11** 14.40 12.70 15.81 3.10** 10.77
Fund fee revenue (US$m / year), control group 8.18 12.05 3.87** 22.37 12.02 17.95 5.93** 28.82
Difference in fee revenue (US$m / year) 0.17 -0.58 -0.75** -2.79 0.68 -2.14 -2.82** -10.73
Panels E to H: First funds that are managed by the same/different principals as the first follow-on funds from the same firm.
Panel E: First fund return 
Fund return (percent / month), treatment group 1.53 0.85 -0.69** -6.60 1.27 0.84 -0.43** -4.19
Fund return (percent / month), control group 1.24 0.79 -0.45** -5.70 1.00 0.72 -0.28* -2.59
Difference in return (percent / month) 0.29 0.06 -0.23** -3.00 0.26 0.12 -0.14 -1.77
Panel F: First fund alpha
Fund alpha (percent / month), treatment group 0.99 0.49 -0.50** -6.17 0.82 0.49 -0.32** -3.63
Fund alpha (percent / month), control group 0.64 0.37 -0.27** -3.83 0.61 0.35 -0.25** -3.35
Difference in alpha (percent / month) 0.35 0.12 -0.23** -2.76 0.21 0.14 -0.07 -0.97
Panel G: First fund AUM
Fund AUM (US$m), treatment group 55.30 122.83 67.54** 23.15 217.62 320.08 102.46** 16.55
Fund AUM (US$m), control group 54.90 94.38 39.48** 38.53 210.66 278.60 67.95** 25.19
Difference in AUM (US$m) 0.40 28.45 28.05** 8.03 6.97 41.47 34.51** 7.74
Panel H: First fund fee revenue
Fund fee revenue (US$m / year), treatment group 2.84 5.48 2.64** 13.86 8.82 12.10 3.27** 12.93
Fund fee revenue (US$m / year), control group 3.14 5.77 2.64** 6.18 8.03 9.08 1.04** 4.43
Difference in fee revenue (US$m / year) -0.30 -0.30 0.01 0.02 0.79 3.02 2.23** 5.32
Panels I to L: First funds that are engage in the same/different strategies as the first follow-on funds from the same firm.
Panel I: First fund return 
Fund return (percent / month), treatment group 1.52 0.84 -0.69** -12.03 1.26 0.77 -0.49** -5.99
Fund return (percent / month), control group 1.23 0.73 -0.50** -8.69 1.08 0.70 -0.38** -6.09
Difference in return (percent / month) 0.29 0.10 -0.19** -3.88 0.18 0.07 -0.11 -1.64
Panel J: First fund alpha
Fund alpha (percent / month), treatment group 0.98 0.48 -0.50** -10.92 0.79 0.43 -0.37** -5.06
Fund alpha (percent / month), control group 0.69 0.37 -0.32** -6.99 0.57 0.33 -0.25** -4.67
Difference in alpha (percent / month) 0.29 0.10 -0.19** -4.13 0.22 0.10 -0.12* -2.06
Panel K: First fund AUM
Fund AUM (US$m), treatment group 146.35 236.27 89.91** 41.64 132.16 259.22 127.06** 58.56
Fund AUM (US$m), control group 139.06 224.93 85.87** 81.21 136.22 206.69 70.47** 29.88
Difference in AUM (US$m) 7.30 11.34 4.04 1.87 -4.06 52.53 56.59** 20.85
Panel L: First fund fee revenue
Fund fee revenue (US$m / year), treatment group 5.35 8.22 2.87** 48.05 6.20 10.09 3.89** 30.67
Fund fee revenue (US$m / year), control group 5.21 7.34 2.13** 15.03 6.50 9.51 3.00** 8.55
Difference in fee revenue (US$m / year) 0.14 0.88 0.74** 5.76 -0.30 0.58 0.89* 2.31
same principals different principals
same strategies different strategies
Table 9
Event study, additional analyses
This table reports results from an event study analysis of first fund attributes around the launch of the first (or later) follow-on fund by the same hedge fund firm. First funds are the first funds
launched by each hedge fund firm. The fund attributes analyzed include fund return, alpha, AUM, and fee revenue. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model.
Event month is the month that the first follow-on fund is launched. The period 'before' is the 36-month period before the event month and the period 'after' is the 36-month period after the event
month. To be included in the analysis, a first fund must survive at least 24 months before and after the event month. Funds in the control group are matched to funds in the treatment group based
on fund return, alpha, AUM, or fee in the 24-month pre-event period. For example, in the fund return analysis, funds in the control group are matched to funds in the treatment group by
minimizing the sum of the absolute differences in monthly fund return in the 24-month pre-event period. Panels A to D report first fund performance, AUM, and fee revenue around the launch of
the second or later follow-on fund. Panels E to L report first fund performance, AUM, and fee revenue around launch of the first follow-on fund. In addition, Panels E to H include observations
from first funds that are managed by the same principals (Columns 1 to 4) or different principals (Columns 5 to 8) as the first follow-on funds from the same firm. Panels I to L include
observations from first funds that engage in the same strategy (Columns 1 to 4) or different strategy (Columns 5 to 8) as the first follow-on funds from the same firm. The t -statistics are derived
from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
second follow-on fund launch third or later follow-on fund launch
12-month look back period 24-month look back period 36-month look back period
Independent variable (1) (2) (3)
FIRSTALPHA 0.743** 0.807** 0.873**
(12.81) (9.72) (8.82)
FIRSTFLOW 0.263** 0.214** 0.171**
(20.02) (13.59) (9.25)
FIRSTVOL -0.077** -0.056 -0.044
(-2.66) (-1.62) (-1.17)
FIRSTHWM -0.007 0.070 0.0465
(-0.07) (0.62) (0.39)
NFIRSTALPHA 0.127** 0.170** 0.118
(2.89) (2.99) (1.91)
NFIRSTFLOW 0.028** 0.010 0.002
(3.91) (1.33) (0.23)
NFIRSTVOL 0.052 0.022 -0.001
(1.57) (0.58) (-0.03)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Adj R -squared 0.024 0.014 0.010
Number of Observations 114,079 108,863 99,930
Table 10
Regressions on first fund flow
Regressions are estimated on the flow of the first funds managed by each hedge fund firm. For each firm, we distinguish between the first fund launched and other follow-on funds.
The dependent variable is first fund monthly flow (FLOW ). The independent variables include FIRSTALPHA , FIRSTFLOW , FIRSTVOL , FIRSTHWM , NFIRSTALPHA , 
NFIRSTFLOW , NFIRSTVOL , where FIRSTALPHA is first fund abnormal return averaged over the last x months, FIRSTFLOW is first fund flow averaged over the last x  months, 
FIRSTVOL is the standard deviation of first fund abnormal returns estimated over the last x months, FIRSTHWM is first fund high-water mark indicator, NFIRSTALPHA is the
average abnormal return of the follow-on funds within the same firm averaged over the last x months, NFIRSTFLOW is the average flow into the follow-on funds within the same
firm averaged over the last x months, and NFIRSTVOL is the standard deviation of follow-on fund abnormal returns estimated over the last x months. The independent variable of
interest is NFIRSTALPHA . The look back period x equals either 12, 24, or 36 months. The regressions include controls for fund investment style and calendar year fixed effects. In
parentheses are the t -statistics. They are derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at
the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable
FLOW






Alpha                                         
(percent / 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
Excess return                      
(percent / 
year)
t -stat of 
excess 
return
Alpha                                         
(percent / 
year)
t -stat of 
alpha
Portfolio (1) (2) (3) (4) Portfolio (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Adjusted for backfill bias Panel G: Fung and Hsieh (2004) model augmented with the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor
Portfolio A (1st funds) 4.61** 2.61 1.28 1.42 Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.99** 5.75 4.94** 6.24
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 3.96* 2.52 0.93 1.03 Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 6.35** 4.31 3.08** 3.10
Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 2.79 1.66 -0.4 -0.34 Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 5.94** 3.61 2.31* 1.96
Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) -0.44 -0.20 -3.98* -2.27 Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 5.20** 2.91 1.38 1.00
Spread (A - D) 5.04** 3.60 5.26** 3.68 Spread (A - D) 2.79** 3.41 3.56** 4.24
Panel B: Adjusted for serial correlation Panel H: Adjusted for fund termination
Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.97** 5.25 4.99** 5.73 Portfolio A (1st funds) 6.86** 4.96 4.19** 5.32
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 6.37** 3.96 3.20** 3.03 Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 5.15** 3.53 2.34* 2.40
Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 5.97** 3.29 2.51 1.95 Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 4.78** 2.94 1.72 1.50
Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 5.25** 2.60 1.50 0.97 Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 4.34* 2.45 0.99 0.75
Spread (A - D) 2.72** 2.84 3.49** 3.70 Spread (A - D) 2.51** 3.09 3.19** 4.00
Panel C: Pre-fee returns Panel I: Sub-sample analysis (January 1994 – December 2003)
Portfolio A (1st funds) 12.52** 8.87 9.79** 12.10 Portfolio A (1st funds) 8.88** 5.19 6.49** 7.77
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 10.32** 6.92 7.44** 7.50 Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 7.11** 4.08 4.84** 4.59
Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 9.48** 5.71 6.36** 5.41 Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 6.68** 3.36 4.22** 3.12
Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 8.17** 4.55 4.77** 3.52 Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 4.94** 2.78 3.11* 2.37
Spread (A - D) 4.35** 5.28 5.01** 6.17 Spread (A - D) 3.93** 3.83 3.37** 3.76
Panel D: Adjusted for dynamic risk exposures using 36-month rolling betas Panel J: Sub-sample analysis (January 2004 – December 2013)
Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.97** 5.00 5.01** 5.30 Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.10** 3.24 3.85** 3.00
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 6.32** 3.82 2.97** 2.67 Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 5.59* 2.35 2.02 1.30
Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 5.91** 3.21 2.60 1.90 Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 5.21* 1.98 1.40 0.77
Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 5.28* 2.62 1.76 1.14 Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 5.45 1.76 0.99 0.44
Spread (A - D) 2.68** 2.99 3.24** 3.62 Spread (A - D) 1.65 1.30 2.85* 2.28
Panel K: Including duplicate share classes
Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.99** 5.75 5.78** 8.86 Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.95** 5.73 5.24** 6.60
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 6.35** 4.31 4.08** 4.96 Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 6.29** 4.29 3.44** 3.52
Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 5.94** 3.61 3.58** 3.77 Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 5.82** 3.54 2.74** 2.36
Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 5.20** 2.91 2.54* 2.19 Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 5.01** 2.81 1.64 1.23
Spread (A - D) 2.79** 3.41 3.23** 4.21 Spread (A - D) 2.93** 3.68 3.59** 4.58
Panel F: Fung and Hsieh (2004) model augmented with out-of-the-money call and put option factors
Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.99** 5.75 5.14** 6.40
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 6.35** 4.31 3.33** 3.31
Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 5.94** 3.61 2.77* 2.28
Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 5.20** 2.91 1.53 1.06
Spread (A - D) 2.79** 3.41 3.61** 4.16
Table 11
Robustness tests
Every month, hedge funds are sorted based on their launch date within each hedge fund firm. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. The Fung and and Hsieh (2004) factors are the Standard &
Poor's (S&P) 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF ), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC ), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S. ten-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the ten-year bond
(BD10RET ), change in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over ten-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY ), bond PTFS (PTFSBD ), currency PTFS (PTFSFX ), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM ), where 
PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. Panel A reports results adjusted for backfill bias by removing the return observations before fund listing date. Panel B reports results after unsmoothing returns using the Getmansky, Lo, and
Makarov (2004) algorithm. Panel C reports results after adding back fees to form pre-fee returns. Panel D reports results adjusted for dynamic risk exposures by using a rolling 36-month window to calculate factor loadings. Panel E
reports results after augmenting the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the MSCI Emerging Market Index excess return. Panel F reports results after augmenting the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the Agarwal and Naik (2004) out-
of-the-money call and put option factors. Panel G reports results after augmenting the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. Panel H adjusts for fund termination by assuming that a fund
delivers a -10% return for the month after it stops reporting returns. Panels I and J report results for two sub-sample periods: January 1994 to December 2003 and January 2004 to December 2013, respectively. Panel K reports results
after including duplicate share classes in the fund sample. The t -statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1%
level.
Panel E: Fung and Hsieh (2004) model augmented with an emerging markets equity factor









Follow-on fund  
monthly flow
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SECONDALPHA -0.001 0.012 1.066 0.405 0.116
(-0.04) (0.11) (1.75) (0.73) (1.92)
NSECONDALPHA 0.024* 0.324* 0.591 1.331* 0.150









Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R -squared 0.050 0.159 0.105 0.115 0.044
Number of Observations 3,602 3,602 3,602 3,602 172,170
SECONDALPHA 0.003 0.110 1.973** 1.367* 0.081
(0.33) (0.80) (3.21) (1.97) (0.87)
NSECONDALPHA 0.010 0.404 0.964 1.787* 0.457**









Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R -squared 0.046 0.162 0.110 0.118 0.039
Number of Observations 2,990 2,990 2,990 2,990 169,290
SECONDALPHA 0.009 0.106 1.992** 1.579* 0.110
(0.78) (0.70) (2.79) (2.04) (1.03)
NSECONDALPHA 0.018 0.584* 1.586 1.93 0.568**









Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R -squared 0.043 0.160 0.109 0.114 0.037
Number of Observations 2,902 2,902 2,902 2,902 165,821
Panel C: Regressions with monthly alphas averaged over the last 36 months
Table A1
Regressions on second or later follow-on fund attributes and flow
Regressions are estimated on the fees, redemption terms, and flows for the second or later follow-on funds managed by each hedge fund firm. For
each firm, we distinguish between the first follow-on fund launched and other funds. In the fund attribute regressions, the independent variables
include SECONDALPHA and NSECONDALPHA , where SECONDALPHA is the alpha of the first follow-on fund within the same firm averaged over
the last x months prior to the launch of the follow-on fund and NSECONDALPHA is the alpha of the other funds (including the first fund but
excluding the first follow-on fund) within the same firm averaged over the last x months prior to the launch of the follow-on fund. In the fund flow
regressions, the independent variables include SECONDALPHA , NSECONDALPHA , FUNDALPHA , FUNDFLOW , FUNDVOL , and FUNDHWM , 
where FUNDALPHA is own fund alpha averaged over the last x months, FUNDFLOW is own fund flow averaged over the last x months,
FUNDVOL is standard deviation of own fund abnormal returns estimated over the last x months, and FUNDHWM is own fund high-water mark
indicator. Fund management fee and performance fee are in percentage, while fund redemption period and notice period are in business days. The
regressions include controls for follow-on fund investment style and year fixed effects. Inception year fixed effects are used for the regressions on
follow-on fund characteristics while calendar year fixed effects are used in the regressions on follow-on fund flow. The t -statistics, derived from
robust standard errors that are clustered at the fund level, are in parentheses. In Panels A, B, and C, the look back period x equals 12, 24, and 36
months, respectively. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable
Panel A: Regressions with monthly alphas averaged over the last 12 months
Panel B: Regressions with monthly alphas averaged over the last 24 months
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
FIRSTALPHA 0.136** 0.093** 0.107** 0.062* 0.057* 0.035 0.126** 0.107** 0.097** 0.076* 0.104** 0.095**
(3.73) (2.65) (3.83) (2.55) (2.56) (1.56) (3.33) (2.75) (3.36) (2.50) (3.92) (3.55)
log(NFIRSTSIZE ) -0.119** -0.105** -0.080**
(-2.98) (-3.59) (-3.13)
NFIRSTMGTFEE 0.103 0.137 0.051
(0.88) (1.52) (0.63)
NFIRSTPERFFEE 0.035** 0.029** 0.012
(3.21) (3.74) (1.90)
NFIRSTNOTICE 0.003 0.002 0.002
(1.46) (1.66) (1.32)
log(FIRSTSIZE) -0.056 -0.065* -0.042
(-1.77) (-2.52) (-1.91)
FIRSTMGTFEE 0.003 0.031 0.027
(0.04) (0.45) (0.42)
FIRSTPERFFEE 0.011 0.003 -0.001
(1.17) (0.44) (-0.09)
FIRSTNOTICE 0.002 0.002 0.001
(1.01) (0.97) (0.76)
Strategy Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Inception Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adj R -squared 0.030 0.089 0.028 0.122 0.008 0.085 0.026 0.067 0.018 0.069 0.023 0.062
Number of Observations 867 867 842 842 766 766 1,372 1,372 1,264 1,264 1,164 1,164
Table A2
Regressions on first follow-on and first fund returns
OLS regressions are estimated on the first follow-on fund and first fund performance just after the inception of the first follow-on fund. The dependent variables include first follow-on fund abnormal return
(NFIRSTALPHA ) and first fund abnormal return (FIRSTALPHA ) averaged over the 12-month, 24-month, or 36-month period post follow-on fund inception. Fund abnormal returns are measured relative to
the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 7-factor model. FIRSTALPHA is first fund alpha averaged over the 12-month or 24-month period just prior to first follow-on fund inception. NFIRSTSIZE is follow-on fund assets
under management at inception in US$m. NFIRSTMGTFEE is follow-on fund management fee in percentage. NFIRSTPERFFEE is follow-on fund performance fee in percentage. NFIRSTNOTICE is follow-
on fund redemption notification period in months. FIRSTSIZE is first fund assets under management at first follow-on fund inception in US$m. FIRSTMGTFEE is first fund management fee in percentage.
FIRSTPERFFEE is first fund performance fee in percentage. FIRSTNOTICE is first fund redemption notification period in months. The multivariate regressions include controls for fund investment style and
follow-on fund inception year fixed effects. The t -statistics, derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by firm, are in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. *
Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variable
NFIRSTALPHA FIRSTALPHA
12-month horizon 36-month horizon 12-month horizon 36-month horizon24-month horizon 24-month horizon
IV first stage (probit) IV first stage (OLS)
FIRST RETURN ALPHA CHRONO RETURN ALPHA





Log(SIZE) -0.067** -0.015 0.012 0.110** -0.045** -0.021**
(-7.80) (-1.20) (0.97) (3.46) (-9.54) (-4.55)
MGTFEE -0.005 0.075** 0.080** 0.332* 0.077** 0.083**
(-0.18) (4.19) (4.37) (1.96) (5.30) (5.76)
PERFFEE 0.015** 0.002 0.013** -0.123** 0.008** 0.019**
(5.88) (0.67) (4.13) (-8.77) (4.78) (11.29)
NOTICE 0.004** 0.000 0.000 -0.022** 0.002* 0.002**
(7.23) (0.00) (0.39) (-4.88) (2.29) (2.76)
AGE 0.743** -0.519** -0.541** -3.89** -0.229** -0.226**
(17.28) (-4.33) (-4.76) (-24.76) (-7.98) (-7.79)
STRATEGYFLOW -0.420** 8.01**
(-4.53) (11.54)
F-test: STRATEGYFLOW  = 0 20.52** 133.17**
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 603,129 603,129 603,129 603,129 603,129 603,129
Dependent variable
Table A3
Instrumental variables (IV) analysis
This table reports results from 2SLS regressions that use an instrumental variable approach to examine whether the observed differences in hedge fund
performance between funds that differ in their chronological launch order within firms reflect unobserved differences that endogenously determine
fund launch order. Our instrument for fund launch order exploits the cross sectional differences in hedge fund managers' ability to accumulate capital
at the time of founding. We define hedge fund management company founding strategy fund flow (STRATEGYFLOW ) as strategy flow over the 12-
month period prior to fund management company inception. The strategy used in STRATEGYFLOW corresponds to the investment strategy of the first
fund launched by the firm. Column 1 shows the first stage probit model of first fund status on hedge fund management company founding strategy
fund flow (STRATEGYFLOW ) and the group of control variables used in Table 5. The dependent variable is the first fund dummy (FIRST ). It takes a
value of one when a fund is the first fund launched by a firm and a value of zero otherwise. The independent variables include the natural logarithm of 
hedge fund size (log(SIZE )) where SIZE is in USD million, management fee (MGTFEE ), performance fee (PERFFEE ), redemption notice period in
months (NOTICE ), fund age in decades (AGE ) as well as dummy variables for calendar year and fund investment strategy. Following Wooldridge
(2010), the second stage is estimated by 2SLS using as instruments the first-stage predicted probability. Columns 2 and 3 show the second stage results,
where the dependent variables are RETURN and ALPHA . RETURN is hedge fund monthly net-of-fee return. ALPHA is Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-
factor monthly alpha. Column 4 shows the first stage OLS regression of fund chronology on hedge fund management company founding strategy
fund flow (STRATEGYFLOW ) and the group of control variables used in Table 5. The dependent variable is CHRONO or fund launch order within
the firm. Columns 5 and 6 show the second stage results, where the dependent variables are RETURN and ALPHA . The z -statistics, in parentheses, are
derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund. The R -squareds are omitted as the R -squared has no statistical meaning in the context
of 2SLS/IV. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
IV second stage IV second stage
RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA RETURN ALPHA
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FIRST 0.141** 0.155** 0.127** 0.138**
(9.84) (10.59) (7.00) (7.73)
CHRONO -0.011** -0.015** -0.020** -0.022**
(-13.53) (-16.42) (-3.32) (-4.80)
FIRST 0.149** 0.159** 0.138** 0.144**
(10.75) (11.34) (7.66) (8.30)
CHRONO -0.011** -0.014** -0.022** -0.022**
(-14.28) (-17.03) (-3.67) (-4.94)
FIRST 0.166** 0.081** 0.157** 0.073**
(14.75) (7.13) (8.34) (4.24)
CHRONO -0.006** -0.003** -0.019** -0.009
(-7.71) (-3.02) (-2.93) (-1.88)
FIRST 0.042* 0.049** 0.065** 0.074**
(2.50) (2.94) (3.71) (4.91)
CHRONO -0.005** -0.009** -0.008 -0.013**
(-4.80) (-8.44) (-1.25) (-2.94)
Panel B: Including duplicate share classes
Panel D: Controlling for firm AUM
Dependent variable
OLS Fama-MacBeth OLS Fama-MacBeth
Table A4
Robustness tests for regressions on hedge fund performance
OLS and Fama-Macbeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund performance. The dependent variable is hedge fund monthly return (RETURN ) or 
alpha (ALPHA ). ALPHA is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. The independent variables of interest are FIRST and CHRONO . FIRST is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of one when a fund is the first fund launched by a firm and a value of zero otherwise. CHRONO is fund launch order within the firm. The
regressions control for fund variables such as log(SIZE ), MGTFEE , PERFFEE , NOTICE , and AGE . SIZE is last month fund assets under management in US$m. MGTFEE 
is fund management fee in percentage. PERFFEE is fund performance fee in percentage. NOTICE is fund redemption notice period in months. AGE is fund age in decades.
The regressions include controls for fund investment style fixed effects and calendar year fixed effects (for the OLS regressions). The table reports coefficient estimates on
FIRST and CHRONO only. The coefficient estimates on the fund control variables are omitted for brevity. The t -statistics are in parentheses. For the OLS regressions, they are
derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund, while for the Fama-MacBeth regressions, they are derived from Newey and West (1987) standard errors with a
three-month lag. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Panel A: Adjusted for serial correlation
Panel C: Controlling for firm fixed effects
